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A FARE SHARE: A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO ADDRESS
THE RACIAL DISPARITY IN ACCESS TO PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION FUNDING IN AMERICA
Michael Swistara*

Abstract
Black American households are up to six times less likely to own a car than white
families and are four times more likely to rely on public transportation to meet their
daily needs. Despite this, communities of color have seen consistent disinvestment in
their transit infrastructure. Four hundred years of continued housing segregation
combined with post-recession austerity policies and ongoing pro-automobile bias has
exacerbated this disparity. This Note proposes a straightforward legislative tool to
begin to combat this inequity. The proposed legislation would require that
urbanized areas spend their public transit dollars according to the population density
of the communities a given project would serve, create reporting requirements related
to the racial and economic impact of transit projects, and establish a private right of
action. In proposing this legislation, this Note evaluates the state of civil rights
litigation as it pertains to transportation racism and draws lessons from other areas
such as environmental law in order to put forth a simple solution that would have
tangible effects across the country in both the short and long term.
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INTRODUCTION
It was the cotton that passed through our chained hands that inaugurated this age. It is the flight from us that sent them sprawling into the
subdivided woods. And the methods of transport through these new
subdivisions, across the sprawl, is the automobile, the noose around
the neck of the earth, and ultimately, the Dreamers themselves.1
– Ta-Nehisi Coates
More than six decades after the Supreme Court declared that sepa2
rating train cars on the basis of race was inherently unequal, there remain
vast racial inequities in access to public transportation in America. The
deep inequality in access to funding for reliable and affordable transit has
been characterized as a “transportation apartheid” by Robert Bullard, Director of the Environmental Justice Center in Atlanta, Georgia. 3
Getting to and from work is a daily challenge for many people of
color. People of color have longer commutes than their white counter1. TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 151 (2015).
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the separation of Black and
white train passengers into “separate but equal” train cars), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Andrea Bernstein & Nancy Solomon, Back of the Bus: Mass Transit, Race and Inequality, WNYC (Feb. 10, 2012), https://project.wnyc.org/backofthebus/ [https://perma.cc/
47VX-BPNU].
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parts and are more likely to live near busy roads, increasing their risk of
health impacts from pollution and collision. 4 Black workers are also three
to six times less likely to have a car at home than white workers and are
almost four times more likely to use public transportation for their commute. 5
Due to a history of race-based zoning laws and restrictive covenants
on home ownership that barred Black residents from affluent neighborhoods near job centers in cities and suburbs, Black people are likely to
live farther away from their jobs, making alternatives to driving, such as
cycling or walking, impracticable – and in many areas, the sidewalk infrastructure simply does not exist. 6 As a result, lower-income people of color are disproportionally reliant on public transportation as a means of access to work, school, healthcare, childcare, and recreation. 7 Yet, despite
continued zoning forcing reliance on public transit, Black communities
suffer from disinvestment in their transit networks (and have for decades)

4. ALEX KARNER, DANA ROWANGOULD, JONATHAN LONDON, NAT’L CTR. FOR
SUSTAINABLE TRANSP., WE CAN GET THERE FROM HERE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
TRANSPORTATION EQUITY 19 (2016); ALGERNON AUSTIN, DEMOS, TO MOVE IS TO
THRIVE: PUBLIC TRANSIT AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY FOR PEOPLE OF COLOR 2, 6
(2017),
https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Public%20Transit.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AP9L-TDHE] (finding that “[w]orkers of color are overrepresented
among public transit commuters with “long commutes”—one-way commutes of 60
minutes or longer”); see RICHARD EZIKE, CONG. BLACK CAUCUS FOUND.,
TRANSPORTATION, SUSTAINABILITY, AND EQUITY AND THE EFFECT ON THE AFRICANAMERICAN COMMUNITY 6 (2016), https://www.cbcfinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016
/10/CBCFTransportationBriefing.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GHQ-L6N3]; see, e.g., Evelyn
Nieves, In the Wake of a Teen-Ager’s Death, a Cloud of Racism, Then a Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/19/nyregion/in-the-wakeof-a-teen-ager-s-death-a-cloud-of-racism-then-a-lawsuit.html (detailing the death of a
Black teenage girl who had to cross a seven-lane highway to get to her job, as the mall
where she worked allowed drop-off spots for buses coming from the suburbs but not for
Buffalo’s city buses).
5. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 6-9.
6. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW (2017); See Monica Anderson, Who Relies on Public Transit in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2016), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/07/who-relies-on-public-transit-in-the-u-s/
[https://perma.cc/BZ78-BBQZ].
7. In Los Angeles, for example, 92 percent of bus riders are people of color and their
annual median income is $12,000 (compared to 71 percent non-white and $37,764 across
the entire metropolitan area). Amanda Hess, Race, Class, and the Stigma of Riding the Bus in
America, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Jul. 10, 2012, 8:40 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2012-07-10/race-class-and-the-stigma-of-riding-the-bus-in-america
[https://perma.cc/HCG9-GPWV]; Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA Metro Area,
CENSUS REPORTER, https://censusreporter.org/profiles/31000US31080-los-angeles-longbeach-anaheim-ca-metro-area/ [https://perma.cc/U4DN-FSP7] (last visited Apr. 12,
2021).
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while transportation resources are funneled towards wealthier, whiter,
and less dense neighborhoods. 8
As this Note will discuss in greater detail, beginning in the postWorld War II suburbanization boom and continuing into the 1990s, state
and local adoption of facially “race neutral” policies that favored car
owners widened the divide in access to mobility.9 Rail lines were closed
in Black neighborhoods without adequate replacement. 10 During the
2007-2009 Great Recession era of municipal belt-tightening, even more
transit projects were slowed or cancelled.11 The few projects that proceeded focused on attracting “choice” riders—those who could otherwise drive but choose not to (i.e., wealthier, whiter suburban residents).12
Those who rely on public transportation for their daily needs often pay

8. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY CTY. DEP’T OF TRANSP., SERVICE PLANNING AND
INTEGRATION REPORT 3-19, 4-4, (2013) [hereinafter SERVICE PLANNING AND
INTEGRATION REPORT], https://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/BRT/Resources/Files/
ServiceandIntegrationStudyFinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXT4-VUS4] (explains
how the Purple Line project in Maryland will appeal to “choice rider[s]”); Eric Romann
& Sunyoung Yang, Bus Riders Union: Transit Justice, Not Corporate Welfare – No on Measure
J, STREETSBLOG LA (Oct. 30, 2012), https://la.streetsblog.org/2012/10/30/bus-ridersunion-transit-justice-not-corporate-welfare-no-on-measure-j/ [https://perma.cc/HAJ3PQ29] (arguing against a post-recession transit-funding ballot measure that “has the effect
of substituting on type of transit rider – a choice rider, a tourist, an urban professional –
for a transit-dependent person, generally Black or Latino.”); see generally KENNETH J.
DUEKER & MARTHA J. BIANCO, CTR. FOR URBAN STUDS. PUBL’NS. & REPS., LIGHT
RAIL TRANSIT IMPACTS IN PORTLAND: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 20 (1998) (warning about
transit-oriented development planners “emphasis becom[ing] misplaced, chasing the elusive choice rider while underserving the captive rider.”).
9. See Andrea B. Korb, Note, SEPTA, Philadelphia, and Transportation Equity in America, 3 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 119, 136 (2011).
10. See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, Note, Set the Captives Free! Transit Inequity in Urban
Centers, and the Laws and Policies Which Aggravate the Disparity, 16 GEO. MASON U. C.R.
L.J. 57, 92-93 (2005).
11. See AM. PUB. TRANSP. ASS’N, IMPACTS OF THE RECESSION ON PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION AGENCIES 2 (2010), https://www.apta.com/wp-content/uploads
/Resources/resources/reportsandpublications/Documents/Impacts_of_Recession_March_
2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LDQ-7BYC] (survey results finding widespread budget
shortfalls resulting in layoffs, service cuts, and slowed capital improvements); Joseph W.
Kane & Adie Tomer, Shifting into an Era of Repair: US Infrastructure Spending Trends,
BROOKINGS (May 10, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/shifting-into-an-eraof-repair-us-infrastructure-spending-trends/ [https://perma.cc/7LHK-HDPW] (showing
a decline of over $35 billion in public infrastructure spending between 2009 and 2013);
see, e.g., Joni Earl, Completing Projects With Less Funding: Sound Transit’s Success Story, ENO
CTR. FOR TRANSP. (Jan. 20, 2014), https://www.enotrans.org/article/completingprojects-less-funding-sound-transits-success-story/ [https://perma.cc/Q456-PRK6] (detailing Seattle metro region’s struggle to institute project cuts and delays to public transportation in the face of declining post-2007 funding levels).
12. See sources cited supra note 8.
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more into the system than their communities receive back, as metropolitan area transit boards spend most of their budgets on these “choice” riders, who constitute a minority of each system’s ridership. 13
The handful of statutory and judicial attempts to remedy this inequity have failed. This is in large part because of the heightened restrictions the Supreme Court has placed on civil rights plaintiffs seeking
to bring claims under Title VI, the provision of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin in programs receiving federal funding. 14 A legislative fix is possible.
This Note proposes legislation that would require that public transportation spending be apportioned to projects on the basis of population density, increase transparency through mandatory reporting requirements,
and create a private cause of action.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the history of racial discrimination as it pertains to public transportation funding and accessibility, with a focus on the post-war suburbanization of America. Part II illustrates the state of the problem currently, with case studies of Boston
and Baltimore as examples. Parts III and IV discuss past attempts to address this problem, including litigation strategies and attempted statutory
fixes. Finally, Part V proposes a new piece of federal legislation which
builds upon past attempts and provides a robust and workable framework
for tackling this issue by requiring that public transportation spending be
allocated according to population density.
I. History of Housing and Transportation Segregation
The long history of racial discrimination and bigotry in the United
States intersects with public transportation law and policy at all levels of
government. In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court upheld a statute
that explicitly banned Black and white passengers from riding public
transit together. 15 When civil rights activists boycotted this de jure segregation in Montgomery, Alabama in 1955, the city’s bus service retaliated
by modifying or entirely cutting routes that included stops in predominantly Black neighborhoods. 16 The chronic underfunding of affordable

13. See, e.g., N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 905 F. Supp. 1266,
1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing MTA’s proposed fare hike for urban riders to subsidize
commuter rail, which redistributed funding away from the NYCTA such that wealthier
whiter suburban commuters had 50 to 60 percent of their commute subsidized relative to
40 percent for urban commuters), rev’d, 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995).
14. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 2021); infra Part III.A.
15. See Plessy, 163 U.S. 537.
16. See Negroes’ Boycott Cripples Bus Line, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1956, at 71; see also Hess,
supra note 7.
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and accessible transportation in communities of color continued long after Brown v. Board of Education overturned Plessy v. Ferguson in 1954. 17
The advent of the personal automobile and subsequent federal policies encouraging suburban sprawl supercharged these geographic racial
disparities. 18 In the New Deal era, the Roosevelt administration created
the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) to help make homeownership
more affordable for white families, in part through the creation and financial backing of longer-term, lesser down payment mortgages. 19 The
FHA “redlined” neighborhoods, drawing lines on a map around predominantly Black neighborhoods and systematically denying home financing
assistance by refusing to back mortgages in those “redlined” areas. 20 This
policy meant that the FHA did not back many loans made in urban
neighborhoods. For example, between 1934 and 1966 the FHA “did not

17. See Robert D. Bullard, Addressing Urban Transportation Equity in the United States, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1183, 1187 (2004) (states spend most of their transit money on
highways and roads to the detriment of urban transportation needs); Laura Bliss, Public
Transit Faces Its Own Police Reckoning, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Jun. 26, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-06-26/how-public-transit-got-overpolicedand-underfunded [https://perma.cc/S3G3-HXK5] (detailing how investment in transit
since the 1970s has largely focused on highways and attracting suburban riders with expensive rail projects, along with underinvestment in bus networks as they are perceived
more as “social welfare” than “public utility”); This Is What Defunding Transit Looks Like,
TRANSITCENTER. (Jan. 23, 2017), https://transitcenter.org/this-what-defunding-transitlooks-like/ [https://perma.cc/S4KE-ZD3H] (describing the implications for riders in
California or Governor Schwarzenegger’s elimination of the State Transit Assistance program).
18. This transportation segregation was supported by explicit government choices that,
in tandem with housing policy, established a map of geographic segregation in cities and
counties all across America that persists to this day. See Tracy Jan, Redlining Was Banned
50 Years Ago. It’s Still Hurting Minorities Today, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/28/redlining-was-banned50-years-ago-its-still-hurting-minorities-today/; see also Emily Badger, How Redlining’s
Racist Effects Lasted for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/08/24/upshot/how-redlinings-racist-effects-lasted-for-decades.html; Maria Godoy, In U.S. Cities, The Health Effects of Past Housing Discrimination Are Plain to See, NPR
(Nov. 19, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/11/19
/911909187/in-u-s-cities-the-health-effects-of-past-housing-discrimination-are-plain-tosee [https://perma.cc/W6WA-7NDT].
19. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 50, 64-67 (“Because the FHA’s appraisal standards
included a whites-only requirement, racial segregation now became an official requirement of the federal mortgage insurance program.”); Alexis C. Madrigal, The Racist Housing Policy That Made Your Neighborhood, ATLANTIC (May 22, 2014), https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/the-racist-housing-policy-that-madeyour-neighborhood/371439/ [https://perma.cc/TQ7P-8QHJ] (“The FHA explicitly refused to back loans to black people or even other people who lived near black people.”).
20. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 64-65; Madrigal, supra note 19.
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insure even one mortgage” in Camden or Paterson, cities in New Jersey
with significant Black populations. 21
During President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Great Society” policy push,
Congress sought to undo some of the redlining of the past with the passage of the 1968 Fair Housing Act. 22 The 1968 Act ended the FHA’s racist mortgage support policy and barred discrimination in the sale, rental,
and financing of housing on the basis of race. 23 However, part of the
compromise to pass the Fair Housing Act resulted in stripping the bill of
key enforcement provisions. 24 The same year, Congress passed the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 to expand the role of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in providing public housing and housing assistance. 25 The 1968 HUD Act included a
provision that sought to directly remedy redlining by guaranteeing the
mortgages of lower-income households. 26
Yet these remedial legislative actions resulted in accelerated white
flight from urban cores and further undermined the ability of Black families to build wealth through homeownership. 27 Realtors used this new
federal aid to “blockbust” by selling homes to newly eligible Black families and then scaring white families into panic selling out of fear their
homes would lose value if the racial composition of their neighborhood
changed, resulting in more sales for the realtors. 28 The resulting white
21. Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just an Environmental Issue, 84 MARQ. L.
REV. 301, 306-07 (2000).
22. See Douglas S. Massey, The Legacy of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, 30 SOCIO. F. 571,
575-79 (2015) (describing the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, including the context of its passage in the aftermath of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination, the bill’s “lofty goals,” and the Dirksen compromise that stripped it of its key enforcement mechanisms).
23. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 804, 82 Stat. 73 (1968); see also
History of Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov
/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo/history [https://perma.cc/YP2ATA5R] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
24. See Massey, supra note 22, At 575-79.
25. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476
(1968).
26. Id. § 235.
27. See Lewyn, supra note 21, at 307 (highlighting how Section 235 of the 1968 Housing Act “fueled ‘white flight’ from cities” in part by incentivizing “blockbusting” and
other racist private practices); Kevin Fox Gotham, Separate and Unequal: The Housing Act
of 1968 and the Section 235 Program, 15 SOCIO. F. 13, 13 (2000) (finding that the federal
market-based subsidy approach to housing policy that allowed “white families to purchase
‘new’ housing in suburban areas . . . [while] African American families purchased ‘existing’ . . . inner city” homes hurt Black families’ ability to build wealth); see also Why Is
This Happening?: Undermining Black Homeownership with Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, MSNBC
(Oct. 8, 2019) (downloaded using Apple Podcasts).
28. See Lewyn, supra note 21, at 307.
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flight often meant that Black families had to pay for lower-quality homes
and were not able to afford to leave for new suburban neighborhoods.
This was partly because Black families had been shut out of building the
wealth needed to afford suburban homes, as well as white suburbanites’
continued hostility to integration. 29 Even when they had the money to
do so, Black families were frequently legally barred from moving to more
affluent suburbs by racially restrictive covenants imposed by homeowners
associations (HOAs) and were often met with violence. 30 HOAs were so
prominent in large part because they had been a prerequisite for FHA insurance of many suburban developments when they were constructed.31
These government housing policies, designed to create a postWorld War II suburban “American dream” largely exclusive to white
families, worked in tandem with private industry to hollow out public
transportation systems. Projects like Levittown on Long Island, a model
for future segregated suburbs, were funded with financial backing from
the FHA and Department of Veteran’s Affairs. These projects encouraged
white flight from redlined urban neighborhoods towards car-centered
suburban living where residents could affordably own their own home
and yard – their own slice of “the American dream.” 32 A focus on suburban America and the personal automobile led to “nearly every U.S. transit agency slash[ing] service” after the widespread arrival of cars throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 33 Cities that did expand public transit in the
latter half of the twentieth century focused on commuter rail to bring
suburban white workers to and from the city centers, to the detriment of
local residents within the city. 34 Private industry, through corporations
like National City Lines (owned by General Motors), bought up and
then systematically dismantled city bus networks, which were seen as

29. See Gotham, supra note 27, at 33.
30. See id.; see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 139-52.
31. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 70-71, 78-79 (detailing how FHA policy required
large-scale projects such as Levittown in New York to be racially exclusionary and how
even after the FHA abandoned these policies the government still upheld private racial
covenants through the courts).
32. See id. at 71.
33. Jonathan English, Why Did America Give Up on Mass Transit? (Don’t Blame Cars.),
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Aug. 31, 2018, 11:38 AM), https://www.citylab.com
/transportation/2018/08/how-america-killed-transit/568825/ [https://perma.cc/VN9YXGVT].
34. See Bliss, supra note 17 (detailing how investment in transit since the 1970s has
largely focused on attracting suburban “choice” riders with expensive rail projects, leading
to significant underinvestment in bus networks that tend to serve local and lower income
populations).
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primary competitors to the relatively young personal automobile industry, at the same time that public transit agencies cut service. 35
Thus, racially restrictive housing policies created geographic racial
segregation that forced Black families to live in denser urban areas while
white families left for car-focused suburbia, and both public and private
action gutted public transportation service in those same cities. Transportation racism “combines with public policies and industry practices to
provide benefits for whites while shifting costs to people of color,”36 all
leading to a mismatch of where people live and work such that subsequent “race neutral” policies only further entrench these inequities.37
II. The Problem of Transportation Racism Today
The lengthy history of government sanctioned, racially discriminatory housing policies contributed so heavily to residential segregation that
today most Black Americans still live in metropolitan areas. 38 On average,
Black workers have the longest commutes of any racial demographic
group, are less likely to own cars, and are more likely to rely on public
transportation to meet their daily commuting and travel needs. 39 Given
this, pro-public transit policies have been described as race-conscious policies while cuts to transit service “support[] the agenda of segregation.”40
At the metropolitan level, public transportation funding is often disproportionally focused towards attracting “choice” riders—those who opt to

35. See Patrick Moulding, Note, Fare or Unfair? The Importance of Mass Transit for America’s Poor, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 155, 159 (2005).
36. JUST TRANSPORTATION: DISMANTLING RACE AND CLASS BARRIERS TO MOBILITY
1 (Robert Bullard & Glenn Johnson eds., 1997).
37. See Korb, supra note 9, at 136 (applying Critical Race Theory and the argument
that modern definitions of racism as antithetical to “color blindness” mask the systemically
racist outcomes of “facially neutral” transportation policies).
38. As per the 2010-2014 American Community Survey, 75 percent of Black Americans live in either large cities or their immediate suburbs. See Alana Semuels, No, Most
Black People Don’t Live in Poverty – or Inner Cities, ATLANTIC (Oct. 12, 2016), https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/trump-african-american-inner-city/503744/
[https://perma.cc/DZ3P-SPJP]; see also Kim Parker, Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Anna
Brown, Richard Fry, D’Vera Cohn & Ruth Igielnik, Demographic and Economic Trends in
Urban, Suburban and Rural Communities, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 22, 2018), https://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/05/22/demographic-and-economic-trends-in-urban-suburbanand-rural-communities/ [https://perma.cc/RZT2-UF5Z] (between 2000 and 2012-16,
urban counties went from majority white to majority non-white).
39. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 9; Anderson, supra note 6.
40. Korb, supra note 9, at 136; Fabricio Rodriguez, Proposed Metrobus Cuts Continue a
Long, Intertwined History of Transit and Race, GREATER GREATER WASH. (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://ggwash.org/view/62135/transit-and-race-in-the-washington-region-have-a-longintertwined-history [https://perma.cc/5RJT-EQF6].
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use public transit but have the choice to drive instead—who are more
likely to be wealthier white suburbanites. 41 Bringing in choice riders expands the fare base in a way catering to existing riders does not, and so
cities will often fund expensive new projects to incentivize such new riders. 42 This flow of resources towards choice riders only further reinforces
the racial disparity in access to public transportation.
Following the 2007-08 housing crisis and the subsequent “Great
Recession,” many municipalities instituted austerity programs that hurt
public transit by cutting service and raising prices. 43 While not entirely
new, 44 the scale of these recent budget cuts have accelerated the focus on
attracting more “choice” riders who, by convincing riders who may otherwise choose driving, can grow the fare-base rather than making service
improvements for transit-reliant communities. 45 The austerity measures
have disproportionally hurt Black communities and communities of color
that rely on public transportation for access to work, healthcare, education, grocery stores, and other vital aspects of daily life.46
Traditional social science research argued that it was the physical
distance, or “spatial mismatch,” between job centers and residential areas
that most hurt Black Americans displaced by racist housing policies.47
New research asserts that proximity to jobs is less important than access to
transportation. 48 This research notes that transit access relates to more
than just job opportunities, but also to grocery store accessibility and to
other key metrics for health and wellbeing. 49 Economists at Harvard Uni-

41. See sources cited supra note 8; Hess, supra, note 7 (explaining that U.S. cities are
“eager to attract” choice riders, often going to the lengths of raising fare prices for the
‘captive’ majority of riders to attract these choice riders with “bells and whistles” for new
lines or stations); see also Jinhua Zhao, Valerie Webb, and Punit Shah, Customer Loyalty
Differences Between Captive and Choice Transit Riders, 2415 J. TRANSP. RSCH. BD. 80 (2014)
(detailing the benefits of a “customer retention” model over the “choice” rider focused
model preferred by many municipalities).
42. See Hess, supra, note 7.
43. See sources cited supra note 11.
44. Laura Bliss, Out of Darkness, Light Rail!, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Jan. 17, 2020, 3:26
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-17/when-america-fell-inlove-with-light-rail [https://perma.cc/H3P6-GD26] (Noting that in his first year in office
“Ronald Reagan cut federal support for transit by 32 percent.”).
45. See, e.g., SERVICE PLANNING AND INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 8, at 56 (explaining how the greenlit Purple Line project in Maryland will appeal to “choice rider[s]”
when Red Line project to urban Baltimore was cancelled).
46. See Rodriguez, supra note 40.
47. See, e.g., John F. Kain, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Three Decades Later, 3
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 371 (1992).
48. See Brian S. McKenzie, Neighborhood Access to Transit by Race, Ethnicity, and Poverty
in Portland, OR, 12 CITY & CMTY. 134 (2013).
49. See id. at 137-38.
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versity have recently found that shorter commute times (as a proxy for
urban sprawl) are strongly correlated with upward mobility. 50
As commute times across the country continue to rise 51 and the climate effects of our fossil-fuel-focused transportation systems are felt with
greater effect, 52 public transportation is increasingly important as a means
for people in metro regions to get around quickly and with less of a carbon impact. Hopefully, cities will begin to respond to the climate crisis
by investing more in resilient, green public transit networks. If they do, it
is of the utmost importance that this expansion is equitable. However, a
combination of austerity economics, race politics, and a deeply entrenched pro-car bias is actively continuing a practice of spending a disproportionate share of public transit funding on less dense, more prosperous areas that need it less. 53 In metropolitan areas, this can amount to a
redistribution of money from communities of color, which contribute
disproportionally more fare dollars into transit organizations than they receive back. 54 Reallocating a larger share of funding to denser neighbor-

50. See Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility II: County-Level Estimates, 133 Q. J. ECON. 1163, 1210-12 (2018) (finding
commute times to be the most correlated variable with intergenerational mobility).
51. See Christopher Ingraham, Nine Days on the Road. Average Commute Time Reached a
New Record Last Year., WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/10/07/nine-days-road-average-commutetime-reached-new-record-last-year/ (detailing the rise in commute times across the country); Gabriela Saldivia, Stuck In Traffic? You’re Not Alone. New Data Show American Commute Times Are Longer, NPR (Sep. 20, 2018, 6:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09
/20/650061560/stuck-in-traffic-youre-not-alone-new-data-show-american-commutetimes-are-longer [https://perma.cc/2F43-FEB7](citing experts who speculate that longer
commute times are likely due to a combination of population growth, the rise of ridesharing apps that require a constantly moving fleet of vehicles, and an increase in delivery
trucks like those from Amazon).
52. See Bruce Liebermann, A Brief Introduction to Climate Change and Transportation,
YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (Sept. 22, 2019), https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org
/2019/09/a-brief-introduction-to-climate-change-and-transportation/ [https://perma.cc
/D8Y9-DHKD].
53. See sources cited supra note 17; see also infra Part II.A; Luis Antonio Lindau, Dario
Hidalgo, and Adriana de Almeida Lobo, Barriers to planning and implementing Bus Rapid
Transit systems, 48 RES. TRANSP. ECON. 9 (2014) (citing a bias towards expanding private
car travel and expanding roads to accommodate more lanes as one of several reasons that
Bus Rapid Transit systems face political opposition); Paul Mees & Jago Dodson, The
American Heresy: Half a Century of Transport Planning in Auckland (Jan. 2, 2001) (presented
to joint conference of New Zealand Geographical Society and Australian Institute of Geographers) (describing the “policy bias towards the private car” in Auckland, New Zealand and comparing it to a majority of major American cities in terms of low rates of public transportation use and urban planning focus on highways and accommodating private
automobiles).
54. See, e.g., N.Y. Urb. League, Inc. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 905 F. Supp. 1266,
1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discusses proposal “to raise fares 20% for the NYCTA on which
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hoods would serve as a good proxy to address racial disparities in transit
access as denser neighborhoods tend to be lower income and more racially diverse. 55
Boston and Baltimore, as two older cities with long and complex
histories of public transportation and residential segregation, serve as good
case studies for demonstrating how modern transit decisions continue to
perpetuate, effect, and create racial disparities. In both cities, Black communities saw reliable transit networks decline or disappear entirely. In
Boston, the rerouting of rail lines left diverse neighborhoods like Roxbury off the metro map, while in Baltimore the streetcar network was
destroyed without any rail replacement. When East and West Baltimore
were finally about to secure approval for the long-promised Red Line rail
link, it was cancelled in favor of light rail running through the wealthiest
suburb of the state. While this problem has national scope, each of these
cities is a prime example of the need for a plan that would reinvest transportation dollars in denser, lower income, and majority-minority communities.
A. Boston Case Study
The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), Boston’s
provider of light rail, heavy rail, and bus services, ranks amongst the most
used public transportation networks in the country, with ridership per
mile of both its light and heavy rail ranking first and second, respectively,
in the nation. 56 However, like the city of Boston itself, 57 the MBTA has a

almost 60% of the riders are minority and to raise fares only 9% for the riders on the
commuter lines which are over 80% white.”).
55. See JENNY SCHUETZ, ARTURO GONZALEZ, JEFF LARIMORE, ELLEN A. MERRY &
BARBARA J. ROBLES, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., ARE CENTRAL
CITIES POOR AND NON-WHITE? 12 (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres
/feds/files/2017031pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XA6-6AQH] (finding lower income
tracts have higher population density and a higher percent of Black and Hispanic residents); see also ALEXANDER TSIATAS, POPULATION DENSITY AND DIVERSITY: AN UPDATE
TO SCHELLING’S MODEL 11 (2010), https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~atsiatas/density.pdf
[https://perma.cc/45ZQ-SUKD] (finding correlation between density and diversity in
San Diego and suggesting higher-density development could encourage more heterogeneous urban neighborhoods).
56. See Laura Bliss, A U.S. Transit Atlas That Ranks the Best (and Worst) Cities for Bus
and Rail, CITYLAB (Nov. 28, 2018, 11:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2018-11-28/the-u-s-cities-with-the-best-and-worst-transit-mapped
[https://
perma.cc/8SG9-KGJY].
57. See, e.g., GUY STUART, THE CIVIL RTS. PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV.,
SEGREGATION IN THE BOSTON METROPOLITAN AREA AT THE END OF THE 20TH
CENTURY 6 (2000), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/metro-andregional-inequalities/metro-boston-equity-initiative-1/segregation-in-the-boston-
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long history of racial segregation and discrimination that manifests in disparate access to transit today.
Boston’s public housing projects, like those in the rest of the country, 58 were racially segregated for decades. 59 Brookline, Massachusetts, just
outside of Boston and currently served by the MBTA, was one of the
first jurisdictions in the country to use racially restrictive deeds in private
housing. 60 White flight to racially restricted suburbs in the twentieth century created the modern majority-Black Boston neighborhoods of Roxbury and Mattapan. 61 Roxbury was once serviced by an elevated rail line,
the Orange Line, until the city shut down service to Roxbury in 1987 in
order to reroute the southern portion of the line to a newly constructed
railway to the west, where the MBTA had recently taken possession of
land along the Southwest Corridor alongside the Amtrak right-of-way.62
Though the elevated rail infrastructure was never removed, the rerouted
tracks were laid at least half a mile away from the original route, placing
it just outside of the Roxbury neighborhood. 63 This meant that while
Roxbury was once accessible by the Orange Line as a major transit artery, today, the entire neighborhood does not have a single metro station,
forcing residents to transfer from buses or walk long distances to access
rail transit.64
Roxbury residents have some of the longest commutes in the region and most expensive transit fares in the country. 65 The relatively
poor, densely populated neighborhood of around 126,000 people sits in a
transit “void,” where one resident who lives just two miles from work
may have to take two buses and spend over half an hour commuting. 66 In
Boston, Black bus riders average a 46 minutes plus commute, almost

metropolitan-area-at-the-end-of-the-20th-century/stuart-segregation-boston-20thcentury-2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4DV-T59D].
58. See INST. FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, UNIV. OF WISCONSIN-MADISON, A History of Residential Segregation in the United States, 34 IRP FOCUS, Mar. 2019, at 2, 3 (asserting that when the Public Works Administration constructed public housing during the
New Deal era, “all of the projects were segregated”).
59. See Seymore, supra note 10, at 86; see also Richard Rothstein, Race and Public Housing: Revisiting the Federal Role, 21 POVERTY & RACE, Nov./Dec. 2012, at 1, 14-15.
60. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 6, at 78.
61. See Seymore, supra note 10, at 85-86.
62. See id. at 92.
63. See id. at 93.
64. See Eric Moskowitz, Wide Racial Gap Exists on Speed of Boston-area Commutes,
BOSTON.COM (Nov. 23, 2012), https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2012/11/23
/wide-racial-gap-exists-on-speed-of-boston-area-commutes
[https://perma.cc/P3WBRG2C].
65. See id.
66. See id.
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67

double that of white commuters who drive. On top of removing nearby
rail access, Boston at one point housed more than half of the city’s buses
at a depot in Roxbury, which MBTA has acknowledged contributed to
asthma rates in the neighborhood that are many times higher than those
in the rest of Boston and in the State of Massachusetts as a whole. 68 This
relates to broader environmental justice concerns as air quality is worse
across the Greater Boston area in majority-minority communities. As one
recent study found, this disparity in air quality is not geographic happenstance, but is the direct result of housing and transit policy.69
In contrast, Brookline—a town just outside of Boston’s city limits—
has several rapid transit options despite being a less populous and less
dense community than Roxbury. 70 The MBTA’s B, C, and D Lines all
stretch into and through Brookline, while Roxbury is notably shut out of
the metropolitan region’s light rail network. 71 Brookline is overwhelmingly white. Black residents represent only 3.41 percent of the population
compared to 61.65 percent in Roxbury. 72
As rail spending focused on the suburbs around Boston, the more
than a third of MBTA riders who relied on the city bus system saw their

67. See id.
68. See Seymore, supra note 10, at 99 (“Asthma rates in Dorchester, Mattapan and
Roxbury are as much as 178 times the state average.”); see also BOS. PUB. HEALTH
COMM’N, COMMUNITY MEETINGS 2004: HEALTH STATUS REPORT FOR ROXBURY 31
(2004),
https://www.bphc.org/healthdata/archive/Documents/Roxbury%20Health
%20Status%202004.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE95-DH23] (demonstrating that across all age
groups, the asthma rate in Roxbury is greater than that of the rest of Boston).
69. See Conor Gately & Tim Reardon, Racial Disparities in the Proximity to Vehicle Air
Pollution in the MARC Region, METRO. AREA PLANNING COUNCIL (May 2020), https://
www.mapc.org/pollution-disparities-covid19/
[https://www.mapc.org/pollutiondisparities-covid19/ [https://perma.cc/YP3B-MM7A].
70. See Seymore, supra note 10, at 83 (“Whereas the upper-middle class town of
Brookline has several trolley lines, residents of the economically-depressed communities
of Roxbury and Mattapan must rely primarily on bus service”). Roxbury has a population
of 63,672 people and a density of 14,252 per square mile, compared to Brookline’s similar
population of 59,180 people spread out such that density is only 8,754 per square mile.
See Brookline, MA Demographics, AREAVIBES, https://www.areavibes.com/brookline-ma
/demographics/ [https://perma.cc/46Y6-RAFY] (last visited Mar. 9, 2021) and Roxbury,
Boston, MA Demographics, AREAVIBES, https://www.areavibes.com/boston-ma/roxbury
/demographics/ [https://perma.cc/9SBK-A282] (last visited Mar. 9, 2021).
71. It should be noted that this is in part because Brookline sits on the east-west corridor and so trains to other western suburbs are required to go through Brookline. However, these suburbs are also disproportionally wealthier and whiter and so the argument for
Brookline largely extends to them as well. See Transit Map of Boston Metro Area,
GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps [https://perma.cc/EK7W-BHSW]
(search for “Brookline, MA” and select “Transit” from the menu to display transit map).
72. See Brookline, MA Demographics, supra note 70; Roxbury, Boston, MA Demographics,
supra note 70.
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share of funding decline to just 17 percent of the agency’s capital investment. 73 In the early 2000s, 40 percent of Boston’s public transit funding
went to commuter rail lines serving just 10 percent of its ridership, while
less than two-thirds of the city’s under-funded buses arrived on time. 74
One analysis into the fair share of transit resources found that spending
worked out to a subsidy per rider on MBTA’s commuter rail of $6.89,
compared to just $1.90 per bus passenger. 75 For bus routes serving Roxbury, that subsidy was as low as $0.69 per passenger. 76 The lack of rail
service and disproportionally low bus rider subsidy for Roxbury residents
is illustrative of the disparity in transit funding and thus transit access for
many transit-dependent communities of color. If the MBTA had to apportion its funding at least in part according to population density, communities like Roxbury would receive much closer to their fair share of
regional transit spending. 77
B. Baltimore Case Study
By the end of World War II, Baltimore had one of the most expan78
sive bus and trolley networks on the East Coast. It had been the first
city in America to have a commercial electronic streetcar, launched in
1885. 79 From that single line, the city’s bus and rail network grew. The
network crisscrossed the city, providing east-west and north-south rail
access all over the city during its heyday. 80 Most importantly, the bus and

73. Seymore, supra note 10, at 88 (“[A]ccording to the American Public Transportation Association, the T’s bus system saw just 17 percent of the agency’s capital investment, or just $660 million, even though a third of the T’s riders take buses”) (quoting
Raphael Lewis, A Fare Question Under Fire for Its Heavy Investment in Commuter Rails, The
MBTA Is Taking Steps to Improve Service to Bus Riders, Earmarking More Money for that System in Coming Years, BOS. GLOBE, May 20, 2001, at B1.).
74. See id. at 88 n.225 (quoting Brian Braiker, The Terrible T, BOS. MAG., Sept. 2002,
https://www.bostonmagazine.com/2006/05/15/the-terrible-t/ [https://perma.cc/76ZXJ2Q9]); Lewis, supra note 73.
75. Seymore, supra note 10, at 89.
76. Id.
77. Roxbury has roughly the same population as Brookline but is denser, so a spending
regime that allocates more public transportation funding to denser neighborhoods would
benefit Roxbury and other similar neighborhoods. See Brookline, MA Demographics, supra
note 70; Roxbury, MA Demographics, supra note 70.
78. See Sidney Levy, Lost City: Baltimore’s Trolleys, Trackless Trolleys and Buses, MD.
HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.mdhistory.org/lost-city-baltimores-trolleys-trackless-trolleysand-buses/ [https://perma.cc/8E2G-NKYW] (last visited Mar. 9, 2021).
79. Christina Tkacik, When Baltimore’s Streetcars Stopped Running, BALT. SUN (Mar. 22,
2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/features/retro-baltimore/bs-md-retrostreetcar-20190317-story.html.
80. See Levy, supra note 78.
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trolley lines provided extensive coverage to then-redlined neighborhoods
such as Sandtown-Winchester. 81 Sandtown-Winchester was once touted
as “Baltimore’s Harlem” and hosted performances by Billie Holiday and
Diana Ross, but more recently it has become known for the uprising that
broke out following Freddie Gray’s death in police custody in 2015. 82
By the 1960s, Baltimore’s trolley system had gone the way of almost
all major American cities’ streetcar networks and was systematically replaced to make way for cars. 83 A combination of pro-car policies and
corporate action eventually starved the city’s transit system. 84 National
City Lines, the General Motors-owned private transportation company
notorious for buying up and shutting down streetcar lines, purchased Baltimore’s streetcar system in 1948, and the last streetcar ran in November
of 1963. 85
More recently, there have been several pushes to revive public
transportation access for Baltimore’s communities of color, including the
Red Line train that would have connected West Baltimore to jobs centers downtown as well as to the MARC train that connects Baltimore
with the Washington, D.C., metro area. 86 The Red Line project had
been in the works for many years and was championed by the late U.S.

81. See id.; see also Residential Security Map of Baltimore Md., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV.
(1937), https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/32621/Residential
%20Security%20Map%201937.JPG?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc
/2WPU-M9BR] (providing a map of residential redlining in 1937 Baltimore).
82. See Jeremy Ashkenas, Larry Buchanan, Alicia Desantis, Haeyooun Park & Derek
Watkins, A Portrait of the Sandtown Neighborhood in Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/05/03/us/a-portrait-of-the-sandtownneighborhood-in-baltimore.html; see also Eyder Peralta, Baltimore Riots: ‘This Is a Dead
Neighborhood’, NPR (Apr. 28, 2015, 5:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2015/04/28/402848564/baltimore-riots-this-is-a-dead-neighborhood
[https://
perma.cc/U9YS-RZXM].
83. See John Martin, Streetcars: The Transit System America Threw Away, GOVERNING
(June 2014), https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-the-transit-system-we-threwaway.html [https://perma.cc/C7AJ-468H]; see also Joseph Stromberg, The Real Story Behind the Demise of America’s Once-Mighty Streetcars, VOX (May 7, 2015, 9:20 AM), https://
www.vox.com/2015/5/7/8562007/streetcar-history-demise.
84. See supra Part I. Streetcars were particularly vulnerable to the emergence of automobiles in cities that, through regulation or subsidy, fueled the shift to personal car travel.
Some cities required streetcar operators to pay to maintain adjacent roadways that carried
cars while other cities instead opted to grant public transit the right of way. Cities that did
the latter and adopted other pro-transit policies still have streetcars, while cities that forced
streetcar operators to pay for their competition and let them sit in traffic saw their networks disappear. See Bliss, supra note 17.
85. See Levy, supra note 78.
86. See Jeff La Noue, Baltimore’s Red Line Connects More Than You May Think,
GREATER GREATER WASH. (Feb. 5, 2015), https://ggwash.org/view/37092/baltimoresred-line-connects-more-than-you-may-think [https://perma.cc/5TFL-RMCP].
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87

Representative Elijah Cummings. Governor Martin O’Malley greenlit
both the Red Line project and another transit project, the Purple Line, in
2009. 88 The Red Line was to serve the low-income and largely Black
communities of East and West Baltimore while the Purple Line would
connect wealthier suburbs of Washington, D.C. to the city, including
Montgomery County (the wealthiest county in the state and predominantly white) and the more racially diverse, middle-income Prince
George’s County. 89 By the 2014 state gubernatorial election, both projects were nearing the construction phase. The ultimate winner of the
election, Governor Larry Hogan, cancelled the Red Line project, citing
his aversion to tax increases and government spending, returned the federal money, and reallocated the state funding to bridge and highway projects, mostly in white neighborhoods. 90 He did not cancel the Purple
Line. 91
Following Governor Hogan’s decision to cancel the Red Line,
complaints were filed under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits racial discrimination in programs receiving federal funding, leading

87. See Kevin Rector, Cummings Joins Transit Advocates in Urging Continued Support for
Red Line, BALT. SUN (Jan. 7, 2015, 9:20 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business
/bs-md-red-line-forum-20150107-story.html.
88. See Robert Thompson, O’Malley Backs Light Rail for Purple Line, WASH. POST
(Aug.
4,
2009),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/getthere/2009/08/omalley_
backs_light_rail_for_p.html?wprss=getthere (covering O’Malley’s back-to-back press conferences announcing the Purple and Red Lines in the same day).
89. See Alon Levy, How You Can Tell Larry Hogan’s Decision to Kill the Red Line Was
Racially Discriminatory, STREETSBLOG USA (Apr. 21, 2017), https://usa.streetsblog.org
/2017/04/21/how-you-can-tell-larry-hogans-decision-to-kill-the-red-line-was-racialdiscrimination/ [https://perma.cc/JH4Q-FEYF]; Maryland at a Glance: Income, MD.
STATE ARCHIVES (Sept. 24, 2019), https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/01glance
/economy/html/income.html [https://perma.cc/4VN6-B2HG]; Louis Peck, Major
Events in the History of the Purple Line, BETHESDA MAG. (Jun. 25, 2015, 1:56 PM), https://
bethesdamagazine.com/bethesda-beat/news/major-events-in-the-history-of-the-purpleline/ [https://perma.cc/X57H-7684].
90. See Colin Campbell, Five Years Later, Many Across Baltimore Bitterly Lament Gov.
Hogan’s Decision to Kill the Red Line Light Rail, BALT. SUN (Sept. 11, 2020), https://
www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-pol-red-line-five-years-20200911b2d3knvbpngdrirbc44fd55pti-story.html; see also Daniel C. Vock, Danielle E. Gaines &
Bruce DePuyt, Hogan Catches Flak for Red Line Cancellation at U.S. Senate Hearing on Infrastructure, MD. MATTERS (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.marylandmatters.org/2021/02/24
/hogan-catches-flak-for-red-line-cancellation-at-u-s-senate-hearing-on-infrastructure/
[https://perma.cc/7N2P-MZCC].
91. See Michael Dresser & Luke Broadwater, Hogan Says No to Red Line, Yes to Purple,
BALT. SUN (Jun. 25, 2015, 11:25 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-mdhogan-transportation-20150624-story.html.
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to a federal Department of Transportation civil rights investigation. The
complaints alleged that Governor Hogan’s decision to cancel the Red
Line but not the Purple Line was made not on the basis of cost, as he had
claimed, but instead on the basis of racial discrimination, given that both
projects had comparable costs-per-projected-rider and the Red Line was
actually cheaper in terms of total project cost. 93 The complaints were
quickly dismissed—an example of the failure of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act as a means to advance equity in transit access. 94 Civil rights organizations have sued cities across the country for the disparate impact of transit
policies. These cases have largely been unsuccessful due to the deference
to transit agencies in justifying their decisions afforded under Title VI jurisprudence. 95
Governor Hogan’s cancellation of the Red Line helped suburban
residents at the direct expense of urban communities of color. Proponents of the project had estimated it would have reduced commute times
and increased access to job centers.96 Given that lower commute times
have been found to be correlated with upward mobility, the Red Line
could have substantially positively impacted these communities.97 Instead,
the resources were funneled into suburban highway projects, while another light-rail line serving “choice” communities like Montgomery
County is nearing completion. 98 This result could have been prevented if
the state government had been forced to allocate public transit funding at
least in part on the basis of population density, as area the around the

92. See Letter from Yvette Rivera, Assoc. Dir., Departmental Off. of Civil Rights,
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to Larry Hogan, Governor of the State of Md., and Pete K. Rahn,
Sec’y of the Md. Dep’t of Transp. (Jan. 19, 2017), http://s3.documentcloud.org
/documents/3404919/Red-Line-Compliance-Review-Letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/J3DP-JT8R]; see also Katherine Shaver, Federal Officials Close Civil Rights Complaint
About Baltimore Light-Rail Project, WASH. POST (Jul. 13, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/federal-officials-close-civil-rightscomplaint-about-baltimore-light-rail-project/2017/07/13/dda1e216-680e-11e7-8eb5cbccc2e7bfbf_story.html.
93. See Letter from Yvette Rivera, supra note 92; Levy, supra note 78.
94. See Seymore, supra note 10, at 75.
95. See id.
96. See, e.g., Economic Justice, Case: Baltimore Red Line, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC.
FUND (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.naacpldf.org/case-issue/baltimore-red-line/
[https://perma.cc/5YRQ-7M3E].
97. See, e.g., Chetty & Hendren, supra note 50, at 1211.
98. See Katherine Shaver, Purple Line Set to Open in Fall of 2022, Despite Year-Long Delay in Construction Start, Maryland Official Says, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018, 1:32 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2018/09/27/purple-line-set-open-falldespite-year-long-delay-construction-start-maryland-official-says/.
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proposed Red Line is denser than most of the neighborhoods served by
the Purple Line. 99
C. National Scope
The problem of racially disparate access to public transportation, as
exemplified by Boston and Baltimore, manifests itself in cities and towns
across the country. In the South, cities typically have fewer rail lines and
less public transportation infrastructure overall, yet they still exhibit vast
racial and economic disparities in the quality and consistency of neighborhood bus services. For example, a study of Nashville, Tennessee
measuring bus routes against ten standards (such as having a bus stop close
to your home, frequency of buses, and adequacy of bus shelters and
benches along the route) found that the best bus routes serve the wealthier, whiter communities while all of the lowest ranked routes serve communities of color, many of which are only becoming more densely populated. 100
In the Midwest, larger cities spend disproportionally more on suburban commuter routes, while mid-sized cities have heavily disinvested
in public transit across the board. Detroit saw radical declines in public
transit infrastructure throughout the twentieth century akin to Baltimore’s experience, and attempts to increase transit funding faced ani-

99. The density in Montgomery County as a whole is 2,117 people per square mile.
Comparatively, Baltimore City has a population density of 7,594 people per square mile
as a whole with highs along the Red Line corridor with well over 25,000 people per
square mile in West Baltimore. While there are pockets of Montgomery County with
equal or higher density in downtown Silver Spring and Bethesda, the fact that this Note
uses neighborhood level density as a means of allocating transit dollars, it still holds that
West Baltimore is transit-poor relative to its population density across neighborhoods. See
USA
Population
Density,
ARCGIS,
https://www.arcgis.com/home/webmap
/viewer.html?webmap=3327e6cc84a84d7194437d7904fb64b3 (in the “Find address or
place” box enter “Baltimore” and click on block groups in West Baltimore to view data)
[https://perma.cc/D723-AAK9]; Population Density, Baltimore City, MD, OPEN DATA
NETWORK, https://www.opendatanetwork.com/entity/0500000US24510/Baltimore_
city_MD/geographic.population.density?year=2018&ref=compare-entity
[https://
perma.cc/PX9X-7GAP] (last visited Mar. 30, 2021); Population Density, Montgomery
County, MD, OPEN DATA NETWORK, https://www.opendatanetwork.com/entity
/0500000US24031/Montgomery_County_MD/geographic.population.density?year=
2018 (last visited Mar. 30, 2021).
100. See MUSIC CITY RIDERS UNITED, BUS ROUTE REPORT CARD 6, 10 (2018), https:
//www.workersdignity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Bus-Route-Report-Card.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R245-7675].
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mosity from white suburbanites. Chicago, as the largest city in the region, has a more extensive and developed rail and bus network. 102 Yet, in
many ways the city is a poster child for the problem this Note seeks to
address. While the downtown-operating Chicago Transit Authority
serves some 80 percent of all regional riders, it receives less capital and
operating funding per rider than Metra, a regional agency serving whiter
suburban counties.103
Finally, on the West Coast, cities that largely developed after the
invention of the private automobile continue to exhibit deep inequities
in funding, ridership, and accessibility of public transportation. In Los
Angeles, 92 percent of bus riders are people of color and riders’ annual
median income is $12,000 (compared to the metropolitan area as a
whole, where 71 percent of residents are non-white and the median income is $37,764). 104 Three-quarters of these riders are not “choice” riders
and are dependent on transit. 105 Despite a victory for the Bus Riders Union in 1995 to stop a fare hike that would have hurt minority bus riders
the most, Los Angeles “cut bus service by 7 percent and bumped transit
fares by 44 percent” between 2008 and 2012. 106
Cities from coast to coast have faced civil rights lawsuits challenging
discriminatory dispersal of transportation funds of the kind described in
this section. 107 Yet none of these have resulted in favorable judicial rulings, so metropolitan transit agencies continue to allocate a disproportionally large share of funding to wealthier, whiter communities.108

101. See Dan Austin, How Metro Detroit Transit Went From Best to Worst, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (updated Feb. 10, 2015, 11:02: AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local
/2015/02/06/michigan-detroit-public-transit/22926133/ [https://perma.cc/7YQW-CXLH].
102. See Let’s Take a Ride: 5 Largest US Public Transit Systems, UNC SCH. OF GOV’T
(Aug. 18, 2014), https://onlinempa.unc.edu/5-largest-us-public-transit-systems-inforgraphic/
[https://perma.cc/79BT-ZAZZ].
103. See Munguia v. Illinois, No. 10-C-0055, 2010 WL 3172740, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
11, 2010); Bob Secter & Richard Wronski, Is It a Fair Ride?, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 7, 2010),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2010-01-07-1001070059-story.html
[https://perma.cc/27XK-SZAG].
104. See sources cited supra note 7.
105. See Hess, supra note 7.
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2011)
(challenging the Bay Area’s metropolitan transit organization); N.Y. Urb. League, Inc. v.
New York, 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995) (challenging the New York metro region’s
transit agency); Munguia, 2010 WL 3172740, at *8 (challenging the Chicago regional
transit agency).
108. See sources cited supra note 8; Darensberg, 636 F.3d; N.Y. Urb. League, Inc., 71
F.3d; Munguia, 2010 WL 3172740; see also Robert D. Bullard, All Transit Is Not Created
Equal, RACE, POVERTY & THE ENV’T, Winter 2005/2006, at 9, 9-10.
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III. Litigation Strategies
Civil rights lawyers attempting to address racial inequities like the
disparate treatment of Black and Brown communities in transport funding decisions often rely on targeted impact litigation. However, traditional Civil Rights Act claims have failed to address this specific problem, and
the Supreme Court has continued to narrow avenues to bring these suits
under Title VI and other civil rights laws. This Note seeks to learn from
the failures of Title VI suits as a means to address transportation racism
and the relative successes in other areas of the law, such as environmental
law, where an effective statutory framework has provided litigators tools
unavailable to civil rights plaintiffs.
A. Title VI
As a cornerstone of the Civil Rights Movement’s legislative and legal victories, the most obvious litigation strategy to address the racial injustice of modern public transportation funding is through Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI states that “[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin . . . . be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”109 Facially, it seems that this would apply to public
transit projects receiving federal funding. In reality, this approach has
faced serious and often dispositive barriers as courts have refused to apply
the discrimination requirement of Title VI when government provides a
“substantial legitimate justification.” 110
However, the government defense of a “substantial legitimate justification” only applies when such cases receive discussion on the merits,
and they are frequently dismissed before even reaching that stage in the
proceedings. 111 Motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) are regularly successful against transportation racism litigants because of the difficulty in showing that there was no substantial legitimate
justification for any discrimination—even if a plaintiff can show that discrimination did occur. 112 Courts are also highly deferential to urban plan-

109. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (Westlaw through Pub. L.
No. 116-259).
110. See, e.g., N.Y. Urb. League, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1036.
111. See, e.g., Buhendwa v. Regional Transp. Dist., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1259, 1273 (D. Colo. 2015) (dismissing a Black bus rider’s claim against a transit agency, who asserted that
their access had been restricted on the basis of race, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted).
112. See Moulding, supra note 35, at 172-73 (“[I]t is still difficult to prove disparate impact (especially cases based strictly on funding and not on service quality) because of the
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ners on matters of municipal transit policy. Heightened pleading standards since Ashcroft v. Iqbal have only made the situation more difficult for
plaintiffs, who must assert even more facts in their initial complaint—
despite transportation racism plaintiffs often lacking key information used
by decision-makers. 114 For similar reasons, when litigants do reach the
merits of a case, they regularly lose. 115 City or state governments can
plausibly argue before a court that their decisions to reallocate funding
from communities of color to “choice” riders are simply to decrease inner city congestion or air pollution, among other possible motivators.116
In New York Urban League, Inc. v. State of New York, a dispute arose
over New York State’s 1995 budget, which had allocated funding away
from both the State’s general fund and the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) towards commuter lines in the surrounding region
(e.g., Metro North and Long Island Railroad).117 The Urban League argued that the greater financial burden this imposed on the disproportionately minority ridership of the NYCTA violated federal Department of
Transportation regulations promulgated under Title VI, namely that
[a] recipient, in determining the types of services, financial aid,
or other benefits, or facilities which will be provided under
any such program [that receives federal funding] . . . may not,
directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize
criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of
subjecting persons to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin.118

inherent discretion urban planners and governments have in setting the priorities of city
infrastructure, including transit systems.”); see also Comm. for a Better N. Phila. v. Se. Pa.
Transp. Auth., No. CIV. A. 88-1275, 1990 WL 121177, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1990)
(granting summary judgment to the transit agency and defendants for similar reasons) (“In
reality, this action is nothing more [than] an attack on the business judgement of
SEPTA.”).
113. See id.
114. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (heightening the notice pleading standard to require that the pleading state specific facts sufficient for a plausible claim of relief).
115. See Seymore, supra note 10, at 77 (dividing Title VI suits into three categories and
highlighting the failure of all but one notable suit since the Civil Rights Movement).
116. See, e.g., N.Y. Urb. League, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1037 (upholding the MTA’s decision to
take money from the city’s transit authority to fund suburban projects because the MTA’s
stated purpose was to effect “a reduction in traffic congestion, pollution, and other adverse effects” of car commuters).
117. Id. at 1034.
118. 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2020) (emphasis added); N.Y. Urb. League, Inc., 71 F.3d at
1035.
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Though this regulation used the word “effect” rather than intent, which
would suggest that non-discriminatory intentions are insufficient to overcome such a challenge, the Second Circuit still dismissed the case and
held that the Urban League was likely to lose on the merits. 119 Its primary
reasoning was that NYCTA funding decisions were ultimately managerial
decisions the court could not remedy with an injunction.120
The holding from New York Urban League has been reaffirmed by
the Second Circuit and other federal courts of appeals on numerous occasions. 121 One of these cases, Darensburg v. Metropolitan Transportation
Commission, challenged the San Francisco Bay Area’s regional transit authority’s “inconsistent application of selection criteria to bus and rail projects.” 122 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that funding allocations disproportionately harmed minority riders. The Ninth Circuit followed the
Second Circuit’s trend, siding with the Metropolitan Transportation
Commission on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination and failed to establish discriminatory effect under
California’s statute with identical language to Title VI.123
As both New York Urban League and Darensburg demonstrate, cases
that allege racially disparate impact due to transit funding are routinely
dismissed or reversed. But dismissal is not the only risk for these cases, as
the Supreme Court has continued to narrow the scope of Title VI
claims. 124 In Alexander v. Sandoval, ruling on a disparate impact challenge
to Alabama’s English-only driver’s license test, the Court held that there
is no private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under Title VI for their disparate impact. 125 This ended the thirty-five-year-long

119. N.Y. Urb. League, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1040.
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 519 (9th Cir.
2011); N.Y.C. Env’t Just. All. v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2000); Cureton v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 198 F.3d 107, 112 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999); cf. Munguia v. Illinois, No. 10-C-0055, 2010 WL 3172740, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2010).
122. Darensburg, 636 F.3d at 514.
123. Id. at 520 (Lower court granted summary judgement for MTA on intentional discrimination but sided with Darensburg at trial on disparate impact claim. 9th Circuit reversed.).
124. See Meridel J. Bulle-Vu, Note, Statistical Intent: A Post-Sandoval Litigation Strategy
for Title VI ‘Impact’ Cases, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 461, 462 (2010).
125. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
reasoned that the “rights-creating” language present in other parts of the law was not present in Section 602 and that the dissent erroneously relied upon a non-precedential footnote from a prior case).
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practice of using Title VI to challenge “neutral policies that have a disproportionate effect on [racial minorities].”126
The Supreme Court’s actions in Sandoval and Iqbal drive home the
need for a remedy outside of traditional civil rights litigation. In this respect, environmental law shows potential. Over the last several decades,
environmental lawyers have made progress overcoming standing challenges and enforcing federal statutes, suggesting that environmental law
may offer promising lessons for litigating transportation racism.
B. Lessons from Environmental Law
As traditional civil rights jurisprudence moves further away from allowing private enforcement and litigants are repeatedly thrown out of
court, recent successes in environmental law litigation can provide potential alternative strategies. During the late twentieth century, environmental lawyers assisted in the passage of landmark federal statutes promoting
environmental goals, such as improving ambient air quality. 127 Importantly, these laws allowed citizens to sue governments that fail to adhere to
the procedural or substantive requirements.128 Some of these statutes, such
as the Clean Air Act, have been used to push for new public transportation infrastructure, but transportation policy can borrow even more from
environmental law. 129
Returning to Boston, in 2006, the citizen group Conservation Law
Foundation (CLF) sued then-Governor Mitt Romney for violating the
Clean Air Act by failing to complete promised public transit projects.130
126. Bulle-Vu, supra note 124, at 462-63; see also Richard A. Marcantonio, Aaron
Golub, Alex Karner & Louise Nelson, Confronting Inequality in Metropolitan Regions: Realizing the Promise of Civil Rights and Environmental Justice in Metropolitan Transportation Planning, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1017, 1042 (2017) (“Judicial enforcement of Title VI became much more difficult in 2001 when the United States Supreme Court decided
Alexander v. Sandoval.”).
127. See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (Westlaw through
Pub. L. No. 116-259); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
4321-4370h (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259); Clean Air Act of 1970, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259).
128. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259) (detailing
Environmental Impact Statement requirements under the National Environmental Policy
Act); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7407-7410 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259) (detailing national ambient air quality standards and State Implementation Plans under the Clean Air
Act).
129. See Conservation L. Found. v. Romney, 421 F. Supp. 2d 344, 347 (D. Mass.
2006) (involving a suit by a citizen group alleging violation of the Clean Air Act when
the government failed to complete promised transit projects under the State Implementation Plan).
130. Id.
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Under Massachusetts’s State Implementation Plan, a large highway infrastructure project (the “Big Dig”) in the Boston metro area was only allowed to go forward because of concessions on bus and rail line projects
that would offset the Big Dig’s environmental impact. 131 These projects
included modernizing stations, increasing frequency of service, and even
132
extending the Green Line out towards Tufts University. While the
State ultimately settled with CLF and then scrapped most of these bus
and rail line projects, 133 the failure to complete previously promised projects set the stage for a subsequent lawsuit by another citizens’ group in
Jamaica Plain, alleging the State had violated a contract due to its failure
to construct the Arborway Green Line extension. 134 While the lawsuit
was ultimately dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, the parties
agreed that the state had failed to complete the Arborway project and restoration as promised. 135
As this Clean Air Act litigation in Massachusetts demonstrates, the
citizen suit provision allowing private enforcement of the State Implementation Plans and National Ambient Air Quality Standards is vital in
advancing meritorious suits concerning the environmental impact of
transportation policy. Creating an analogous citizen suit provision for
public transit funding plans could prevent racial discrimination cases from
being dismissed as frequently as they are under Title VI challenges. If
Sandoval demonstrated the Court’s refusal to read citizen suits into civil
rights statutes, the Clean Air Act has shown that explicit citizen suit language makes bringing such action easier for plaintiffs.
Similarly, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) creates a
mandatory requirement that any major federal project first complete a
mandatory Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment. 136 This disclosure requirement forces the government to at least
consider the environmental impact of its actions and sheds light on the
expected impact for the public. 137 As with other environmental statutes,
NEPA provides for a private cause of action if the government fails to
comply with the requisite procedures. 138 As NEPA defines a major federal
131. Id.
132. See Roger L. Smerage, Two for the T, Three for You and Me: The MBTA’s Exception
to the Three-Year Statute of Limitations, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 729, 744 (2009).
133. See id. at 746.
134. See Arborway Comm. v. Exec. Off. of Transp. & Constr., No. SUCV200700675-E, 2009 WL 1546638, at *1 (Mass. Super. May 26, 2009).
135. Id. at *1, 6.
136. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259).
137. See Helen Leanne Serassio, Legislative and Executive Efforts to Modernize NEPA and
Create Efficiencies in Environmental Law Review, 45 TEX. ENV’T. L.J. 317, 318-19 (2015).
138. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989);
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
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project, its disclosure requirement applies to transportation projects receiving federal funding.139 Through its disclosure requirement, NEPA has
provided victories for environmentalists even when traditional litigation
may not have succeeded. These victories include cancelling entire projects that would have significantly harmed the environment or public
health, adjusting projects like moving road construction sites, and several
other real-world responses to discoveries made in the public environmental review that were never litigated. 140 NEPA’s statutory framework
has been a vital tool for environmental advocates to gain access to decision-making information to facilitate community engagement and even
litigation.
However, there is no analogous federal reporting or disclosure requirement for economic, ethnic, or racial impacts of federal action. 141This
Note recommends the creation of a new reporting requirement analogous to the NEPA requirements for environmental impact and the creation of a citizen suit provision to transit funding allocation. As the field of
environmental law has demonstrated, these provisions are important tools
for nonprofits and other interested citizens to acquire information about
the impact of government projects and to advance litigation challenging
concerning projects. Similar legislative tools should be created to monitor
the impact of federally funded projects on marginalized racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic groups.

139. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(C) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259); e.g., Colo.
River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, (C.D. Cal. 1985) (applying NEPA disclosure requirement to an entire 156-acre tract of land despite the fact that the federal
permit only applied to a small part of the land).
140. For example, in 2001, the Army Corps of Engineers dropped a plan to dredge Bolinas Lagoon in California when a NEPA-required environmental review discovered that
instead of preventing silting in the pristine lagoon (as the project aimed to do) the proposed action would have actually increased silting. In 2007, NEPA disclosures regarding
the environmental, public health, and economic consequences of a highway expansion in
metropolitan Atlanta led to the Georgia Department of Transportation modifying the
project from adding lanes to merely converting a lane already there into a reversible HOV
lane. Elly Pepper, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, Never Eliminate Public Advice: NEPA Success
Stories (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.nrdc.org/resources/never-eliminate-public-advicenepa-success-stories [https://perma.cc/5ZPP-T2HM].
141. The closest to such a requirement is Executive Order 12,898, which requires federal agencies to identify, and, to the extent practicable, address disproportionate health
and environmental effects on minority communities from all major agency action. See
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 32 C.F.R. § 651.17 (Feb. 11, 1994).
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IV. Current Statutory Framework and Attempted Legislative
Fixes
Public transportation in America is funded through a combination
of rider fares, money from the local, state, and federal governments, and
earnings by the regional transit agency itself from sources such as bonds
and advertising revenue. 142 In 2016, total public transportation funding
reached an all-time high of $70.67 billion.143
Over the last several decades, the federal government has increasingly used its significant financial influence in transportation spending to
encourage a variety of programs, from bicycle infrastructure to recreational trails. 144 While some of this federal influence has been used to indirectly benefit communities of color through funding transit workforce
development in marginalized communities or championing safer school
commutes, 145 existing legislation does not go far enough to address the
deep inequities in access to public transportation nationwide. 146 In large
part, this is because of the broad discretion state governments have in deciding how to spend their budgets. Fiscal pressure on transit budgets since
the recession has incentivized states and municipalities to attract new riders that grow the fare base rather than improve transit access for existing
riders, which only further encourages spending to disproportionally flow
to wealthier, whiter suburbs where residents are less reliant on public
transportation. 147 In order to more directly benefit the communities that
need public transit the most, the federal government should pass new legislation directing its spending towards denser areas and creating greater
transparency in public transportation decision-making.

142. See AM. PUB. TRANSP. ASS’N, 2018 PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION FACT BOOK 16
(2018),
https://www.apta.com/wp-content/uploads/Resources/resources/statistics
/Documents/FactBook/2018-APTA-Fact-Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/GPH2-JGXT].
143. Id.
144. See RICHARD C. EZIKE, CONG. BLACK CAUCUS FOUND., THE FAST ACT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY 10 (2017), available at
https://www.cbcfinc.org/publication/the-fast-act-implications-for-the-african-americancommunity/.
145. See id. at 1.
146. See Beth Osborne, New Principles for Our Transportation Program, CENTURY FOUND.
(May 11, 2016), https://tcf.org/content/report/new-principles-transportation-program
/?agreed=1 (describing past legislative efforts like the FAST Act as “inadequate” and criticizes federal transit planning for failing to consider accessibility, including specific criticism
that Congress has failed to require states or MPOs measure accessibility to multimodal
transportation).
147. See sources cited supra note 8; and see sources cited supra note 11.
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A. Federal Funding Framework
Federal government funding to local and statewide public transpor148
tation projects is split between operational costs and capital expenses.
The former includes the costs associated with maintaining and running
current modes of public transportation, maintaining transit stations, and
purchasing transportation from private operators such as privately-run bus
routes or after hours taxi services. 149 The latter, capital expenses, fund
purchases of all new large equipment like buses and train cars, as well as
the construction of new rail lines or other new infrastructure projects.150
Federally funded public transportation projects allow for no more than a
50 percent matching share for operating costs, which still represent the
majority of federal public transportation dollars spent (some twothirds). 151 Unlike operating costs, federal capital expense dollars will
match up to 80 percent of state and local funds. 152 Despite making up a
smaller share (the remaining third) of government public transit spending,
the federal government is involved in more capital projects than operational ones across the country. 153 Federal dollars account for less than 10
percent of all operational costs, but close to 40 percent of capital expenses. 154
The federal government funds local public transportation projects
through six major programs, all administered by the Federal Transit Authority. 155 The largest of these programs, the Urbanized Area Formula,
accounts for 39 percent of all authorized funding under the Federal Public Transportation Program, the largest federal transit spending program. 156 The Urbanized Area Formula program disburses funds to all cities with populations over 50,000, which are divided into two
categories. 157 Cities with populations between 50,000 and 200,000 receive funding according to population and population density, while cit148. See WILLIAM J. MALLETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42706, FEDERAL PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM: IN BRIEF 3 (2021).
149. See MALLETT, supra note 148, at 3.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 3-4.
154. See id. (in 2018, the federal government funded 36.2 percent of capital expenses
and 8.6 percent of operational costs); AM. PUB. TRANSP. ASS’N, supra note 142, at 16-17
(in 2016, the federal government financed 41 percent of all capital spending compared to
8 percent of operational costs).
155. See MALLETT, supra note 148, at 4.
156. See id.
157. 49 U.S.C.A. § 5307 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259); 49 U.S.C.A. §
5302(23) (West 2021).
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ies over 200,000 receive funding according to six criteria: total population, population density, bus revenue vehicle miles, bus passenger miles,
fixed guideway revenue miles, and fixed guideway route miles.158
The remaining 61 percent of federal public transportation funds is
distributed among five other programs, which include a program providing funds for repairing existing transit infrastructure, a program providing
investment in new transportation projects, and a program specifically targeting the mobility needs of the elderly and people with disabilities.159
With the exception of the Rural Area Formula program, which “provides funding to states and Indian tribes for public transportation outside
of urbanized areas,” 160 almost all federal transportation dollars flow towards a handful of large cities, 161 This is mostly due to distribution requirements based on population, along with the fact that 73 percent of all
public transit trips occur in just ten metropolitan areas.162
B. Transit Spending Bills from 1991-2016
In 1991, Congress passed the first in a flurry of the largest federal
transportation planning legislation since the Eisenhower-era investments
in the interstate highway system. 163 The first of these statutes was the Inter-modal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (“ISTEA”), passed in
1991. 164 ISTEA promoted the twin goals of creating a national, economically-efficient transportation system that created jobs while complying
with all environmental regulations. 165 ISTEA vested transportation planning with Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs)—federally man-

158. A “passenger mile” is a unit denoting one mile traveled by one passenger on public
transportation, “revenue miles” is a passenger mile unit denoting paying passengers on
trains or planes, “fixed guideway” refers to railways, and “route miles” are the physical
distance of rail or other fixed guideway tracks. Id.
159. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 5309 (Capital Investment Grant), 5310 (Enhanced Mobility of
Seniors and Individuals with Disabilities), 5311 (Rural Area Formula), 5337 (State of
Good Repair), 5339 (Bus and Bus Facilities).
160. MALLETT, supra note 148, at 6.
161. See id. at 4.
162. These ten areas are: New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C.,
Boston, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Seattle, Miami, and Atlanta. MALLET, supra note 148,
at 2.
163. Dennis C. Gardner, Transportation Reauthorization: A Summary of the Transportation
Equity Act (TEA-21) for the Twenty-First Century, 30 URB. LAW. 1097, 1097 (1998).
164. Id.
165. Joseph P. Thompson, ISTEA Reauthorization and the National Transportation Policy,
25 TRANSP. L.J. 87, 99 (1997).
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dated regional planning boards originally established under the FederalAid Highway Act of 1962. 166
Legal scholars have criticized this delegation of planning authority
to MPOs as ineffective at addressing metropolitan areas’ actual transit
needs, as MPOs are ultimately subservient to state governments that hold
funding and decision-making authority. 167 This led to conflicts that frustrated the ability of MPOs to properly carry out ISTEA’s goals in urban
areas because states tend to prefer road-building and other suburbanfocused projects. Adding to this problem is inadequate federal oversight
into state and local planning. 168
State governments largely used the broad discretion they were
granted under ISTEA to foster suburban sprawl. 169 Between 1992 and
1997, the annual increase in newly developed land (a proxy for suburbanization) peaked. 170 While the successor to ISTEA, the Transportation Equity Act for the Twenty-First Century (“TEA-21”), was larger and more
ambitious, it did not change these inherent conflicts in decision-making
authority. 171
President Clinton signed TEA-21 in 1998. 172 At the time, TEA-21
was “the largest public works bill enacted in the nation’s history.”173

166. Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240, §
1006(a), 105 Stat. 1914 (1991).
167. See Benjamin K. Olson, The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century: The Failure of Metropolitan Planning Organizations to Reform Federal Transportation Policy in Metropolitan Areas, 28 TRANSP. L.J. 147, 159-61 (2000).
168. See id. at 170-71.
169. See id. at 171 (“[A] substantially smaller percentage of federal transportation funds
continues to be spent on urbanized areas than the percentage of the population those areas
represent.”) (citing SURFACE TRANSP. POL’Y PROJ., GETTING A FAIR SHARE: AN
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION SPENDING 1-5 (1996)).
170. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2015 NATIONAL RESOURCES INVENTORY: SUMMARY
REPORT
2-7
(2018),
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS
/nrcseprd1422028.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9EP-J9RP]. Land development is a good proxy
for suburbanization because most Americans live in suburbs, suburbia accounts for the highest growth rate areas, and the average suburban dweller takes up more land (and emits more
carbon) than urban residents. See Christopher Boone, The US Has Become a Nation of Suburbs, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 19, 2018, 6:41 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-ushas-become-a-nation-of-suburbs-101501 [https://perma.cc/T7N4-W8JL]; William H.
Frey, Big City Growth Stalls Further, as the Suburbs Make a Comeback, BROOKINGS (May 24,
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2019/05/24/big-city-growth-stallsfurther-as-the-suburbs-make-a-comeback/ [https://perma.cc/LC7X-V9BC]; Chris Mooney,
Scientists Just Showed What Building a New Suburb Does to the Atmosphere, WASH. POST (Mar.
8, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp
/2018/03/08/scientists-just-showed-what-building-new-suburbs-does-to-the-atmosphere/.
171. Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat.
107 (1998).
172. Id.

WINTER 2021]

A Fare Share

551

However, after only one six-year period, the Highway Trust Fund,
which finances most federal road and mass transit projects through gas
taxes, 174 was spending more money than it raised through revenue, and
funding disputes led to the bill lapsing. 175 In 2005, George W. Bush
signed TEA-21’s successor: the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (“SAFETEA-LU”).176
Once again, SAFETEA-LU represented the “largest public works bill in
U.S. history,” 177 but largely missed the opportunity to meaningfully
change racially disparate outcomes. While massive in scale, these bills
mostly maintained the status quo and failed to address how the distribution of transit dollars exacerbated racial inequities. 178
President Obama signed two more bills in the TEA line of legislation during his presidency: the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st
Century Act (“MAP-21”) in 2012 and the Fixing America’s Surface
Transportation (“FAST”) Act in 2015. 179 The FAST Act made marginal
advancements beyond prior legislation towards addressing racial inequity
by including specific outreach to underrepresented groups, such as the
Black community, in its workforce training and technical assistance
grants. 180 However, much of the FAST Act’s implementation plan was
“up in the air” after Donald Trump was elected President in 2016.181 It is
a little early to draw conclusions at the time of this Note’s publication,

173. Bullard, supra note 17, at 1198 (quoting Dennis C. Gardner, Transportation Reauthorization: A Summary of the Transportation Equity Act (TEA-21) for the Twenty-First Century, 30 URB. LAW. 1097, 1097 (1998)).
174. See What is the Highway Trust Fund, and How Is It Financed?, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-highway-trust-fund-and-how-itfinanced [https://perma.cc/FN53-BKM5] (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
175. See Jeff Davis, 20 Years Ago This Week: House, Senate Pass Final TEA21 Legislation –
May 22, 1998, ENO CTR. FOR TRANSP. (May 22, 2018), https://www.enotrans.org/article
/20-years-ago-today-house-senate-pass-final-tea21-legislation-may-22-1998/ [https://perma.cc
/R7GD-8YFF].
176. Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 11444 (2005). See also EZIKE, supra note 144, at 3.
177. Jenna Musselman, SAFETEA-LU’s Environmental Streamlining: Missing Opportunities
for Meaningful Reform, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 825, 825 (2006).
178. For example, ISTEA required transportation plans to comply with Title VI, but as
this Note demonstrates violations of Title VI are difficult to enforce when municipalities
can assert a multitude of accepted ‘substantially legitimate justifications’ for planning decisions – and since ISTEA passed the Supreme Court has further restricted rights of action
under Title VI. See supra Part III.A; Bullard, supra note 17, at 1198.
179. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312
(2015); Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126
Stat. 405 (2012). See also EZIKE, supra note 144, at 2.
180. See EZIKE, supra note 144, at 1.
181. Id. at 11.
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but the Biden Administration has signaled that investment in infrastructure will be a priority.182
While the FAST Act represented movement in the right direction,
it did not tackle the core problem—the racial gap between access to public transportation and public transit funding, which equates to a loss of
opportunity for social mobility within urban communities of color. Specifically, the FAST Act failed to acknowledge or address the disproportionate toll pro-car and “choice” rider policies have on communities of
color across America. Investing in job training is necessary, but it should
be paired with halting disinvestment away from transit-reliant communities of color that too often goes towards flashy new projects in less reliant,
wealthier, and whiter suburban neighborhoods. Reinvesting in denser,
more diverse communities will go a long way towards addressing the
fundamental racial disparities in access to reliable and efficient transit.
New legislation, proposed herein, requiring that public transit dollars
flow primarily to where density suggests they are required could have a
greater impact on breaking down the inequalities of access to public
transportation by reinvesting in the communities that are most reliant on
it.
V. A New Solution
Congress should enact legislation to address the racial inequities in
transportation funding and access that have gone unanswered by litigation
and previous transit bills. The proposed law would require that spending
be allocated according to the population density of the community
served, mandate NEPA-style impact reporting, and create a private cause
of action to challenge state and local government entities for violations.
Because it places these conditions on only a small share of a state’s budget, the proposed bill avoids the constitutional issue of coercion, a doctrine
that limits congressional action to financing conditions that are clearly defined and can be opted out of by states without disastrous consequences.
If enacted, the legislation would greatly improve access to and quality of
public transportation for communities that are reliant on public transit for
their everyday needs.

182. The plan unveiled by the White House on March 31, 2021 would—if passed—be
the largest investment in transportation infrastructure in decades. The Biden plan includes
$20 billion to “‘reconnect’ communities of color to economic opportunities,” a promising sign that this bill may learn from some of the drawbacks of past transit legislation. See
Jim Tankersley & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Biden Seeks to Use Infrastructure Plan to Address
Racial Inequities, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/01/us
/politics/biden-infrastructure-racial-equity.html.
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A. The Proposed Bill
The proposed solution for addressing the disparate public transportation funding to communities of color is a bill (“the Act”) that would
place conditions upon federal spending for state and local government
transit projects. Three key provisions set out these conditions. First, the
Act would require that any project receiving federal funding to allocate
its spending according to population density as the primary consideration.
Second, it would require state and local governments to report the racial,
ethnic, and economic impacts of all proposed public transportation projects. Third, the Act would include a citizen suit provision to provide
standing for private citizens or citizen groups to challenge state and local
governmental failure to comply with the statute. With these provisions,
the Act learns from the failures of prior litigation attempts and legislative
actions, and borrows from other, more successful, areas of statutory regulation such as environmental law.
1. Allocating Spending to Projects According to Population Density
The first of the Act’s major provisions would use Congress’ spending authority to require that state and municipal governments apportion
their public transportation funding to projects according to the population density of the neighborhoods served if the project is to receive federal funding. 183 The federal government, predominantly via the Urbanized Area Formula program, which apportions funds to cities with
populations larger than 50,000, currently apportions its funding using
population density as one of many factors.184 However, once that money
is allocated to the states and municipalities, the Urbanized Area Formula
has no condition that the money be spent according to the needs or density of any given area. 185
The proposed density requirement would, in practice, mean that
the respective state or local governing entity responsible must give top
priority to projects serving densely populated communities when decid-

183. In order to avoid being coercive to states more reliant on federal transportation
dollars, the Act shall only condition federal dollars up to 2 percent of a state’s spending in
a given fiscal year. See infra Part V.B.
184. See MALLETT, supra note 148, at 4-5.
185. State and local governments can apply for Urbanized Area Formula funding for
“eligible activities” such as the planning of transit projects, and funding is granted to the
Governor or metropolitan area entity on the basis of the existing statutory formula.
See Urbanized Area Formula Grants – 5307, FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., https://
www.transit.dot.gov/funding/grants/urbanized-area-formula-grants-5307 [https://perma.cc
/NK2G-CEAG] (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
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ing where to allocate funding for federally supported public transit projects. This will not change the high-level formulas used to allocate federal
dollars nationally, and thus should have no bearing on the ratio of money
flowing to urban versus rural regions of the country or even within a given state. Instead, this provision will impose a condition on how that
money, once apportioned, is spent towards transit projects in a given
metropolitan area.
Like the existing Urbanized Area Formula, the Act should apply
only to “urbanized areas” (UAs), which are defined by the Department
of Transportation and the Census Bureau as urban regions with “50,000
or more people.” 186 As of May 2018, there were 486 UAs holding 71.2
percent of the United States population. 187 Implementing the new density
requirement should be straightforward because it cleanly fits alongside the
existing Urbanized Area Formula; the Act simply adds conditions onto
that funding. Furthermore, by focusing on money already going to urbanized areas, this Act can avoid the backlash that has occurred when
transit agencies propose service or funding cuts in rural areas. 188 The Rural Area Formula Program receives its own funding which would not be
affected by this Act in any way.
This provision should state that public transportation funding for
operational improvements as well as new capital projects must be apportioned based on the population density of the served neighborhood
community. This Note recommends using the neighborhood as the level
of community to apportion funding. Census tracts are too small in larger,
denser urban areas such that transit lines or stops likely will not pass
through every tract, while the county level is far too large and would
mean that large groups of neighborhoods could be entirely ignored.
Thus, to receive federal funding for public transit projects, projects that
serve denser neighborhoods must be prioritized. This does not mean that
less-dense areas will get no funding, or that all funding must flow to areas
that already have plenty of transit. Instead, it would require that when
state or local governments decide where to apportion funding for improvements or new projects, they must prioritize investment in denser

186. These UAs are defined geographically around one or more “central places” with
surrounding densely populated “urban fringes.” Urban and Rural, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/geography/guidance/geoareas/urban-rural.html [https://perma.cc/534Q-QBGB].
187. Urban Area Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 15, 2018), https://www.census.gov
/programs-surveys/geography/guidance/geo-areas/urban-rural/ua-facts.html [https://perma.cc
/7TRT-SKBS].
188. See, e.g., Amtrak Faces Rural Backlash Over Proposal to Cut Long-Distance Routes,
WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2019, 6:59 AM), https://www.wsj.com/video/amtrak-faces-ruralbacklash-over-proposal-to-cut-long-distance-routes/F2E6CBB0-A3F4-4AF2-8D3CD4878C21165D.html [https://perma.cc/F66F-SMSL].
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189

neighborhoods. In setting such a strong standard for where transit
spending will go, this provision meets the goals of the Act in reducing
opportunities for discretionary spending that perpetuates racial divides in
quality of, and access to, good public transportation.
Despite the many benefits of such a presumption towards densitybased spending, there are circumstances where exceptions must be allowed to meet equity goals of transit planning. One potential concern is
that this provision would overly restrict MPOs, preventing spending in
less dense areas for the purpose of transit-oriented development (TOD).
TOD, as the name suggests, seeks to build transit infrastructure with the
purpose of attracting residents and businesses to a new area, and so by its
nature looks to invest and construct in lower-density areas. 190 The Act
can address this concern by creating the ability to apply for federal waivers to fund TOD projects that would otherwise violate the requirements
of the Act. Conversely, the Act should also allow waivers for overinvestment in the densest neighborhoods if needed to address historic underinvestment.
To again analogize to environmental law, the Clean Water Act sets
restrictions on emissions into waterways but allows a limited exception
for “fundamentally different factors,” i.e., truly unique circumstances beyond the financial cost. 191 Similarly, the Act can and should include an
exception for municipalities with a well-developed TOD plan to apply
for a waiver with the Department of Transportation. Like the fundamentally different factors exception in the Clean Water Act, these TOD
waivers should require a high bar to be granted (for example, by matching the bar for Low Income Housing Tax Credit projects), 192 in order to

189. This provision would only apply to initial transit funding allocations. Cost overruns
or other changes later on in the project’s development should not have negative consequences for funding to that community.
190. The Rosslyn-Ballston corridor in Arlington County, Virginia is a prime example of
transit-oriented development. When the Washington, D.C. Metro’s Orange Line was
being built out into the county, the first four stations were placed underground at greater
expense with the goal of rezoning the area around each station. Several decades later, the
effects can be seen in the density around metro stops in the Rosslyn-Ballston corridor relative to the elevated stations with little rezoning further out into the suburbs. See Transit
Oriented Development Advances, NEW URBANISM, http://www.newurbanism.org
/bookstore/todadvances.html [https://perma.cc/7Y9M-C4VV] (last visited Mar. 8,
2021).
191. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(n) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-259).
192. In order to qualify for the LIHTC, developers must meet at least one requirement
of a three-pronged income test; for example, that at least 40 percent of units are occupied
by tenants with an income of 60 or less of the area median income. See What is the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit and How Does It Work?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-low-income-housing-tax-credit-and-howdoes-it-work [https://perma.cc/HBV4-9EL8] (last visited Apr. 15, 2021).
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prevent them from creating a loophole to the goals of this bill. Additionally, there should be an exception to the density requirement for
emergency circumstances, such as repairing a subway tunnel or a light rail
track after an extreme weather event.
In practice, the density provision would ease decision-making by
creating prioritizations for projects that strongly incentivizes local governments to construct projects where they are most needed. 194 Take the
example of Baltimore, discussed previously. 195 Originally, both the Red
Line and the Purple Line projects were approved and were slated to provide new rail service both to urban Baltimore and suburban Montgomery
County, respectively. 196 However, the Maryland governor’s decision to
axe only the Red Line meant that state spending went to projects in less
dense, suburban counties. If the proposed Act had been in effect at the
time, the Red Line would have been prioritized over the Purple Line.
Similarly, in Boston, transit dollars would start flowing into the denser
neighborhoods like Roxbury, which also tend to be poorer communities
of color that are in dire need of better transportation access.
Unlike both TEA-21 and its precursor ISTEA, the proposed Act
would not delegate decision-making authority to state governments.
Similarly, it would not suffer from the funding disputes that ultimately
felled each of the TEA-line of statutes, as it creates a condition on spending rather than allocating temporary funding. Instead, the proposed Act
learns from the mistakes of those earlier statutes and considers the schol-

193. Studies have shown that TODs often fail to attract affordable housing, and so an
ideal candidate for a waiver under this provision will not only include a well-developed
plan but also details for how to attract and build affordable housing. Examples of this include the M Station apartments in Austin, Texas and the Patton Park apartments in Portland, Oregon. Both of these are Low Income Housing Tax Credit projects built near new
transit as part of a “coordinated transportation and land use” plan intended to expand
housing supply while combating exclusionary pricing. Miriam Zuk, Is Transit-Oriented
Development Offering Access to Opportunity?, 24 POVERTY & RACE, May/June 2015, at 1,
6-7.
194. For example, in New York City, the census tract with the highest population density is Corona, Queens (majority Hispanic). Neighborhoods like Concourse Village in the
Bronx (majority Black) are similarly amongst the densest parts of the city. Thus, the proposed Act would direct more MTA dollars to these communities of color. See
POPULATION DENSITY BY CENSUS TRACT, NYC.GOV, www1.nyc.gov › pdf › historicalpopulation › pop_density_1950_2010 [https://perma.cc/XP89-FPQM]; Matt Coneybeare, New York City Population Density Mapped, VIEWING NYC (Dec. 5, 2014, 10:34
AM), https://viewing.nyc/new-york-city-population-density-mapped/ [https://perma.cc
/4TU6-8XW5].
195. See supra Part II.B.
196. See Levy, supra note 78 (“When Hogan was elected in 2014, there were two major
rail projects in the state about to begin construction: the Red Line . . . and the Purple
Line.”).
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arly criticisms of them, while also borrowing successful regulatory techniques from the field of environmental law. In placing a condition on existing federal spending, the Act would remove a degree of discretionary
decision-making authority from state governments, allowing MPOs to
spend where the population needs transit access the most, and because
the conditions are on existing spending there should not be comparable
funding disputes to those that led to the expiration of TEA-21.
2. Impact Statement Reporting Requirement
The second major provision of the proposed Act would require the
agency leading any major public transportation capital project to release
an impact statement to the public. This provision of the proposed Act is
modeled after the environmental impact reporting required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA requires that all proposals for federal agency action “significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment” must be accompanied with a detailed statement of
the action’s impact on the environment. 197 Producing and releasing such
an impact statement will assist in democratizing the transit planning process by providing more information to community groups with a stake in
in the allocation of funding.
Through these so-called sunlight provisions, NEPA has brought to
light all manner of otherwise overlooked or under-considered environmental concerns for proposed federal projects over the decades. Some
disclosures have led to real-world changes in how projects are implemented or have even resulted in projects being moved or canceled entirely. 198 While NEPA lacks any substantive provisions, its procedural requirements forcing agencies to “stop, look, and listen” have been
successfully enforced by federal courts when not properly followed.199
Current Department of Transportation regulations promulgated under Title VI already include some affirmative reporting requirements, but
these “compliance reports” only record “the extent to which members of
minority groups are beneficiaries of programs receiving [f]ederal financial
assistance” rather than statutorily required studies into the likely full impact on minority groups, positive and negative, from federally funded
projects. 200 In other words, the existing requirements speak to the benefits
a community might get from a specific program such as rider fare subsi197. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 116-259).
198. See Pepper, supra note 140.
199. See, e.g., Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 608
F.3d 592, 610 (9th Cir. 2010).
200. 49 C.F.R. § 21.9(b) (2020); Marcantonio et al., supra note 126, at 1042 n.141.
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dies but do not address the impacts of decisions regarding where to spend
repair dollars or where to construct new transit lines. Decision-makers
should take into consideration the widest possible racial, ethnic, and economic implications of their decisions, and report their findings to the
public.
A lack of democratic participation in transit and planning policy has
been a concern for marginalized and impacted communities for decades.
From “slum clearances” for highway construction in the twentieth century that bulldozed communities of color to fulfill top-down priorities to
cancellations of public transportation projects like the Red Line today,
the need to democratize transit planning by engaging effected communities in actual decision-making is clear. 201 The proposed requirement that
all public transportation projects receiving any federal funding must prepare and publicly release a statement detailing its racial, ethnic, and economic impact is a good place to start. In practice, this would provide citizen groups with access to information that they could use for public
pressure campaigns and other political avenues otherwise not available to
affected communities.
In environmental regulation, NEPA disclosure allows for citizen
groups to not only be aware of a government project’s potential impact,
but also to challenge government action if the environmental assessment
has not been properly conducted. An analogous citizen suit provision for
the proposed transportation funding Act would help overcome some of
the traditional litigation barriers described in Part III of this Note and
would shed sunlight on planning decisions in a way that facilitates greater
community involved in urban policy.202
3. A Private Right of Action
The third provision of the Act is to codify a private right of action
to challenge transit funding decisions for substantive or procedural violations of this Act. The proposed Act’s goal of using population density as a
proxy for race in allocating public transportation spending cannot succeed
unless private citizens are able to sue to enforce both its substantive and
procedural requirements. For this reason, the Act must contain a private
right of action.

201. See Alana Semuels, The Role of Highways in American Poverty, ATLANTIC (Mar. 18,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/03/role-of-highways-inamerican-poverty/474282/ [https://perma.cc/T35E-TSPK] (“[I]f they put the highway
in just the right place, it would allow the city to use federal funds to eradicate what they
called a slum area in the center city.”); NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, supra note
96.
202. See supra Part III.A.
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Historically, lawsuits alleging racial discrimination in transportation
funding and access have typically been dismissed with 12(b)(6) motions in
the early stages of litigation. When lawsuits do reach the merits, plaintiffs
virtually always lose because the government can justify its action with a
non-racialized “substantial legitimate justification” for its spending choices (such as desire to attract new riders or to reduce congestion in cities). 203
As the field of civil rights law has demonstrated, private rights of action play an important role in the achievement of progress and when that
ability is limited or taken away, as the Supreme Court did in Sandoval, it
has a negative effect on the ability of individuals facing disparate treatment to seek remedy for racially disparate impact in transportation planning decisions.204 Once again, environmental law can provide lessons on
how to establish a statutory regime of citizen suits powerful enough to
enforce laws passed and halt major construction or development projects
if they violate the law. 205 In order to avoid the potential for the Court to
strip this Act of any implicit right to private action as it did to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in Sandoval, 206 the Act should include an explicit right
to private action. 207
A right to private action would allow for aggrieved individuals or
community organizations to sue state and local governments. For example, had this Act been on the books when the Red Line project in Baltimore was canceled, residents of neighborhoods that would have been
served by the line could have used this provision to sue Governor Hogan. This provision would also mean that plaintiffs will be able to overcome the burden put in place by Sandoval that stripped Title VI of its im-

203. See id.
204. See, e.g., Bulle-Vu, supra note 124, at 462-63 (explaining that private rights of action are primary tools for challenging discrimination that “fill a constitutional gap by
reaching beyond state action to prohibit discrimination in the private sector; however,
they are increasingly losing their enforcement potency.”).
205. See James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30,
10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 1-5 (2003) (explaining the benefits of citizen suits, how they
work in environmental law, and how they “have transformed the environmental movement, and with it, society.”); see also S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 36-37 (1970) (“Authorizing citizens to bring suits for violations . . . should motivate governmental . . . enforcement and abatement proceedings.”).
206. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that there is no implicit right to private action in the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
207. It should be noted that courts have, at times, precluded standing even when Congress explicitly created a private right of action. Litigants may need to demonstrate both
factual as well as legal injury. However, this proposed bill will at least create the necessary
legal injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that a procedural deprivation alone was insufficient to bring a suit under the Endangered Species
Act, which includes a private right of action, without a particularized and concrete injury
in fact).
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plied right of action. Instead, citizens could point to a codified right of
action if other provisions of this Act are violated. In partnership with the
disclosure requirement of the Act, plaintiffs should also have access to
more information for their pleadings necessary to overcome initial
12(b)(6) motions. Including a citizen suit provision would ensure that aggrieved populations could challenge such action without needing to meet
higher pleading standards such as demonstrating intent, 208 and therefore
will prove a vital tool for anti-racist transit advocates.
B. The Congressional Authority to Act
The proposed Act falls under the power granted to Congress by the
Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it accomplishes its
goals of reallocating transportation funding and impact analysis by placing
conditions on federal spending. 209 The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress’ authority to place terms upon the money it disperses to
the states. 210 In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court identified five limits on
this authority, 211 all of which are met by the Act.
First, the exercise of Congress’ spending authority must be to further the “general welfare” of the United States, a deferential limit derived
from the text of the Constitution itself. 212 In Dole, the Court endorsed an
attempt to curb dangerous activity, specifically drunk driving, as “in pursuit of the general welfare.” 213 The Court has stated that in determining
pursuit of the general welfare it must “defer substantially to the judgment
of Congress.” 214 With respect to the proposed Act, its stated purpose is to
pursue greater racial and economic equity, as well as to bolster access to
public transportation for more Americans. The scale of harm racial discrimination has caused to Americans and the landmark action Congress
has taken to address such discrimination over the years suggests that com-

208. See Bulle-Vu, supra note 124, at 463 (noting that, post-Sandoval, courts have allowed suits if plaintiffs can prove intent and that this is a much higher standard than what
was taken away when the Court “denied the existence of a private cause of action critical
to the civil rights movement.”).
209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
210. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15 (1981)
(acknowledging Congress’ “power under the Spending Clause to place conditions on the
grant of federal funds”); Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-43
(1947) (upholding a condition on federal funding that directed suspension of an officer,
citing the authority of Congress “to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to
states shall be disbursed.”).
211. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08, 211 (1987).
212. Id. at 207.
213. Id. at 203.
214. Id. at 207 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)).
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batting such discrimination, including in the public transportation sphere,
is well within the pursuit and furtherance of the nation’s general welfare.
Second, the conditions on federal spending must be unambiguous,
such that states can reasonably discern their options and choose whether
to accept the conditions or not.215 In the proposed Act, the contractual
condition would be unambiguous: states could allocate their public transportation funding based on population density and mandate racial, ethnic,
and economic impact statements, or they could refuse federal funding for
such projects.
Third, the conditions placed on the funding must relate to a “federal interest” in the particular program. 216 In Dole, the Court held that raising the drinking age was germane to the federal government’s interest in
highway funding because it pertained to “safe interstate travel.” 217 Here,
the condition of focusing public transportation spending in denser communities is analogously germane to the federal objectives of subsidizing
public transportation; namely, increasing access to affordable and reliable
means of transportation for the public so as to increase access to jobs,
healthcare, childcare, education, and more.
Fourth, the federal government cannot use the Spending Clause as a
means of encouraging unconstitutional behavior and thus “other constitutional provisions” can bar any effort to do so. 218 There is no independent constitutional bar here. As past lawsuits have demonstrated, there is
no statutory or constitutional barrier to apportioning transportation funds
according to any non-explicitly discriminatory principle. 219
Fifth, conditions on federal spending cannot be coercive, meaning
that that states must have a realistic option to decline it. 220 The Dole court
held that withholding five percent of federal highway funds was not coercive because it represented less than half of one percent of the state’s
budget. 221 Federal appellate courts have subsequently clarified that even
conditioning 100 percent of a small fund or grant is not itself overly coercive, but if that program is large enough, such that the funding would

215. Id.
216. Id. at 207-08.
217. Id. at 208.
218. Id.
219. So long as the government has a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action, courts have upheld transit decisions even when challenged under Title VI. See, e.g.,
Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 2011); N.Y. Urb.
League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1039-40 (2d Cir. 1995).
220. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
221. Id. at 211; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012).
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constitute too large a share of the state’s overall budget, then it becomes
coercive. 222
The Act proposed by this Note would not be coercive as it would
only condition a small share of state budgets. When it comes to transportation funding, the federal government covers 8.6 percent of all operating
costs and 36.2 percent of capital costs for all transit projects nationwide.223
Typically, this equates to approximately 2 percent of a state’s entire annual budget. 224 Two percent is closer to the half percent in Dole than to the
10 to 16 percent of states’ budgets that federal Medicare funds represented in the NFIB v. Sebelius decision which struck down an overly coercive
policy. 225 Therefore, Dole suggests that the spending condition in the proposed Act would be constitutionally appropriate. 226 However, given that
some states rely more on federal transit dollars, the Act should only condition federal transportation spending up to 2 percent of each state’s respective total annual spending. This way the share of federal transporta-

222. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 579-83 (holding that conditioning 100 percent of a federal program that made up between 10 and 16 percent of most states’ total budgets was too
high and thus constituted coercion) [hereinafter “NFIB”]; see also Madison v. Virginia,
474 F.3d 118, 128 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that conditioning 100 percent of federal funding for the state prison system was not coercive as federal funding accounted for only 1.3
percent of the state’s Department of Corrections budget).
223. See MALLETT, supra note 148, at 4.
224. In 2017, 17.5 percent of New York State’s Department of Transportation funding
came from the federal government, amounting to 1.21 percent of the State’s budget for
that year. 2017 Financial Condition Report: Total Spending, OFF. OF THE N.Y. STATE
COMPTROLLER,
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/finance/finreports/fcr/2017/total_
spending.htm [https://perma.cc/3YS8-UVCG]. In fiscal year 2010-2011, 26.5 percent of
Virginia’s Department of Transportation funding came from the federal government,
amounting to approximately 2.4 percent of the state’s operating budget that year. Kali
Schumitz, Budget to Drive General Assembly; Transportation, Education Are Priorities, FAIRFAX
CNTY. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2011/01/04/AR2011010404725.html [https://perma.cc/D6BX-VUXD]; VA. DEP’T OF
TRANSP., FISCAL YEAR 2010-2011: VDOT ANNUAL BUDGET 4 (2010), https://
www.virginiadot.org/about/resources/VDOT_Budget.pdf
[https://perma.cc/58KJAA3M]. In some smaller or more rural states, federal dollars may account for a larger
share of transportation spending; such as Montana for which federal transit dollars were
approximately 6 percent of the state’s total spending in FY 2020. See State and Local Finance Initiative – Montana, URB. INST. (Apr.. 2021), https://www.urban.org/policycenters/cross-center-initiatives/state-and-local-finance-initiative/projects/state-fiscalbriefs/montana [https://perma.cc/7DUS-DETY]; MONT. DEP’T OF TRANSP. BUDGET,
https://leg.mt.gov/content/Publications/fiscal/2021-Interim/Sept-2019/20-year
/54010.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZA7-9ET3].
225. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 580-81 (holding that the financial inducement of all Medicare funding was akin to a “gun to the head” for states given the large share of states’
budget that money represented, and thus violated the bar on overly coercive federal
spending).
226. See id. at 579-83.
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tion dollars withheld would not be coercive even for states for whom
federal spending represents a larger share of their budget.
The Act this Note proposes is clear, unambiguous, in pursuit of the
general welfare of the United States, and conditions no more than 2 percent of a state’s budget in pursuit of its goals. For these reasons, it is well
within the authority of Congress to use its Spending Clause authority to
incentivize states to prioritize public transit projects in denser neighborhoods. Doing so will direct more funding to transit-dependent communities of color and help to address past inequities in access to public transportation funding.
C. The Impact of the Act
The proposed Act would direct more public transportation funding
towards poorer communities of color that are currently not getting their
fair share based on both transit needs and what they pay into most transit
systems. By focusing on population density to apportion transit funding,
the Act will substantially alleviate the “choice rider” problem by diverting resources into denser neighborhoods with greater need. This Act
would increase access to public transit overall, which would reduce
commute times and should further upward economic mobility through
access to more job centers, grocery stores, and others important resources. 227
In Boston, the Act would send more money to Roxbury, since the
density requirement would redirect some of the funds currently flowing
to wealthier suburbs with similar populations but lower density. 228 In Baltimore, the city could finally get its much-needed Red Line rail, as the
Act would redirect more of the state’s public transportation funding into
Baltimore instead of wealthy suburban areas like Montgomery County. 229
Similar effects would ripple across the country, as cities planning public
transit infrastructure improvements and new capital projects would be required to invest a larger share of their funds in denser, often poorer,
communities. 230

227. See Chetty & Hendren, supra note 50, at 1211; McKenzie, supra note 48, at 13738.
228. See sources cited supra note 70.
229. See sources cited supra note 99.
230. For example, the next time Nashville invests money in improvements to its bus
network, this Act would mean that a larger share than before would need to be spent in
some of the denser majority-minority neighborhoods in southeast Nashville that currently
rank the worst in the city when it comes to factors like the number of bus shelters and
frequency of bus service. See MUSIC CITY RIDERS UNITED, supra note 100, at 6, 10; see
also Population Density, Nashville, TN, NEWBORHOOD, https://www.newborhood.com
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In addition to the benefits of greater racial equality in public transportation, spending money according to population density will result in
broader economic justice. Denser neighborhoods tend to be lower income neighborhoods, and so increasing transportation funding for these
areas will have economic benefits that combat socioeconomic inequality. 231 Through shorter commutes and greater access to jobs, healthcare,
education, food, and childcare, spending based on density can help address the challenges of inequality in America’s cities.
Of course, the proposed Act would certainly not be able to alleviate
all of the disparities in public transit access across racial groups. Importantly, by conditioning money already being spent, this Act does little
to address the problems of urban areas that do not invest enough in public transit to begin with. However, conditioning future spending would
require cities to consider the racial and economic implications of their
public transit investments in a way that has never before been done.
In the short term, this Act could deliver tangible improvements for
cities with well-established transit networks. These cities account for the
vast majority of riders nationally, so the effects would be broad and felt
across the country. 232 In the longer term, this Act would establish a
framework for thinking about transportation spending towards equity and
areas of actual need through both its substantive conditions as well as its
disclosure provision. Hopefully, this would mean that as cities continue
to invest in public transportation options for their citizens, they would
focus their efforts on communities that are most reliant on public transit
in their daily lives. In doing so, this Act could spark further improvements in housing and transit accessibility that recenters urban policy on
the improvement of residents lives in a way that could change how cities
plan for a more just and equitable future.233
CONCLUSION
Truly addressing the deep-seated structural racism and inequality
that plagues American cities must be an ongoing endeavor at all levels of
government and society. This Note attempts to take a modest step in this

/moving-guide/population_density/TN/nashville [https://perma.cc/769C-5F7K] (last
visited Mar. 6, 2021).
231. See SCHUETZ ET AL., supra note 55, at 12 (finding that lower income tracts have
higher population density).
232. See MALLETT, supra note 148, at 2.
233. See generally RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER (2016) (advancing the argument
that cities can do more to improve the lives of their citizens through welfare spending
rather than focus on attracting mobile capital, and that ultimately the role of urban governance is to help get their citizens through inevitable difficult times).
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direction by proposing federal legislation that would aim to improve access to public transportation for communities that have historically received under-investment in and have been disproportionally left out of
newly funded projects. The proposed Act would establish a requirement
for urbanized areas to prioritize funding for public transit projects according to the population density of the communities served, create disclosure
requirements evaluating the effects of projects on marginalized groups,
and would codify the ability for citizens to enforce the law. Applying this
legislation to case studies like Boston and Baltimore demonstrates that this
kind of density-focused apportionment will direct more transit dollars to
communities of color and lower income neighborhoods. Denser communities of color and lower income neighborhoods are the most transitreliant in the country but have seen disinvestment in transit accessibility
as budgets have been reduced and remaining funding disproportionally
flows to attracting wealthier, whiter suburban riders over improving accessibility for current transit users. A policy that refocuses transit dollars
on the most transit-dependent communities is an anti-racist policy. As
research has demonstrated, investment that reduces commute times will,
in the long term, raise the chances of upward mobility for communities
across America.

